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Antonio Gramsci is a name practically unknown in America, 
yet he is one of the leading thinkers of the last half-century. An 
Italian Marxist, he died in Mussolini's jails in 1937. When he 
was arrested in 1926 he was 35 years old, married, with one child 
and another on the way whom he never saw. At the time Gramsci 
was a Deputy to the Chamber (a Congressman) and secretary of 
the Communist Party of Italy. 
After being moved from jail to jail he was finally transferred to 
a penitentiary in Bari in July, 1928. For the next six years, until 
his health completely broke down, Gramsci studied and wrote, 
filling thirty-two notebooks with notes, observations, and essays. 
He wrote over a million words, which made up six volumes when 
they were published between 1947 and 1954. States a recent 
Italian encyclopedia: "The thirty~two ~otebooks written in prison 
constitute a very important document of Italian culture ..•. His 
letters from prison are outstanding as an expression of humanity 
as well as culture." 
Gramsci is a Marxist of the caliber of the early Kautsky, and 
he compares favorably with Plekhanov and Rosa Luxemburg. 
He is a Marxist in the great tradition of Marx himself, a thinker 
with an open mind, disciplined in the search for truth. The 
daily newspaper Ordine NuovoJ which he edited, carried on its 
masthead the motto "To Tell the Truth Is Revolutionary." To-
day, when Marxists throughout the world know the consequences 
of a lack of probity and sobriety in theory and practice, Gramsci's 
austere words are fresh and invigorating: 
"We must not conceive of a scientific discussion as if it 
were a courtroom proceeding in which there are a defendant 
and a prosecutor who, by duty of his office, must show the de-
fendant guilty. It is a premise in scientific discussion that the 
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interest lies in the search for truth and the advancement of 
science. Therefore the most 'advanced' thinker is he who under-
stands that his adversary may express a truth which should 
be incorporated in his own ideas, even if in a minor way. To 
understand and evaluate realistically the position and reasons 
of one's adversary (and sometimes the adversary is the entire 
thought of the past) means to have freed oneself from the 
prison of ideologies, in the sense of blind fanaticism. One has 
then arrived at a critical frame of mind, the only fruitful stance-
in scientific research." 
To speak of Gramsci as a Marxist with an open mind may 
strike many people as a contradiction in terms, because the be-
havior of a considerable number of Marxists has bolstered ruling 
class propaganda that Marxism is a dogma. Marxism is not a 
dogma though there are Marxists who are dogmatists, just as 
science is not dogma though there are scientists who are dog-
matists. Marx himself made this point when he averred that he 
was no "Marxist." 
The deeper one's Marxism the less one's dogmatism. But a pre-
requisite for deepening one's knowledge of Marxism is to take 
Marxism seriously. This is the foundation of Gramsci's thought, 
as it was Lenin's. Marxism is a world view, the modern world 
view, the greatest the human mind has so far created. World 
view is a term Gramsci uses constantly. He means by it a system 
of philosophy so embracing as to cover all of human experience, 
knowledge, and activity: art, science, politics, economics, so-
ciology, psychiatry-everything. Christianity, for example, is a 
world view. 
Gramsci never wearies of the assertion that Marxism is an in-
dependent philosophy; it does not need to be blended with 
Freud, Jesus, logical positivism, or what have you. It is autono-
mous, original, capable of inner self.development. Gramsci re-
bukes a writer on the left in Italy who wrote that Marx. was one of 
a series of great scientists. Not at all, says Gramsci, u ••• none of 
the other scientists produced an integrated world view. Marx. 
intellectually originates a historical era which will probably 
last for centuries, that is, until the disappearance of a political 
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society and the advent of a self-administering society." In a 
charming footnote he goes on to point out that the left-wing 
author is less clear-sighted than the Catholic "Monsignor Olgiatti, 
who in his little volume on Marx finds that the only parallel to 
Marx is Jesus. For a prelate this parallel is quite a concession, 
since he believes Jesus was divine." 
What most interest and excite Gramsci are the problems con-
nected with the development of a workers' state. He writes: 
"From the moment when the oppressed class comes to power 
creating a new type of state the necessity arises to construct 
concretely a new moral and intellectual order, that is to say, 
a new type of society. This entails the development of more 
universal concepts, of more subtle and decisive ideological 
weapons ... :' 
And again: 
"In the phase of struggle before taking power the science 
of politics is primarily developed; in the phase of state power 
all the superstructure must be developed, or the state itself 
may disintegrate." [Italics added.-Ed.] 
Gramsci is the analyst of the superstructure, par excellence. In 
area after area-sociology, politics, mass psychology, literature, 
etc.-he deepened Marxism, sometimes going further than Lenin, 
for in many areas Lenin acted as a Marxist but did not write 
and develop the lessons of his experiences. It is no accident that 
Togliatti and the Italian Communists have shown such political 
skill, for the legacy of Gramsci is alive among them. Togliatti was 
'Co-editor with Gramsci on the Ordine Nuovo, and many of the 
older Italian Communists learned their Marxism in the political 
struggles led by Gramsci in the 1920'S. 
Gramsci is concerned with the problems of transition from the 
old society to the new, the problems after socialist state power 
is established: the role of intellectuals in such a state, the dilem-
mas of freedom versus security, all the problems which are today 
so much to the fore. That is why Gramsci sounds so contempo-
rary; that is why his writings are so important. His insights are 
bright weapons in the arsenal of progressive mankind as it fights 
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for man's very existence in the most titanic struggle in the history 
of the species; as it fights against the dark, sanguinary past em-
bodied in the present, including some somber reflections in the 
socialist states themselves. 
Gramsci's writings are now being translated. There is a pro-
found poetic justice that this Communist intellectual whose 
voice fascism stifled, physically destroying him in the process, 
should be heard today at this juncture in history when his in-
sights are most needed and, most important, when his wisdom 
can be heeded. 
Take the problem of freedom of science and art in a transition 
society which is not stable and where the old ideologies are 
powerful and operative throughout the population. This is one 
of the basic problems of contemporary socialist states. Gramsci 
argues that in a transition state, where the society is not stable, 
there is the problem of "setting limits on freedom of discussion and 
propaganda" and he asks who will set these limits, and in fact 
can "these limits be determined at all"? His answer is unequiv-
ocal: 
"I think not. It seems to me that of necessity the search for 
new truths ... must be left to the free initiative of the indi-
vidual scientists-even if scientists continually re-examine 
those very premises which seem most essential, fundamental, 
and settled once and for all." 
(As a political leader Gramsci is aware of the problems which 
freedom creates for a transitional government and he suggests that 
while the scientist must be free the results of his inquiry may be 
subject to examination before being made public. 
Gramsci sharpens the theoretical tools of the working class, 
fighting against the vulgarization of Marxism, particularly its 
reduction to mechanistic determinism. He can understand its 
appeal and even usefulness before the assumption of state power, 
when ". . . the class struggle seems to be a series of defeats for 
the working class. Mechanistic determinism is then a formidable 
morale builder, making for cohesion, perseverance, patience, and 
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stubbornness. The worker says to himself 'I have been defeated for 
the moment but the logic of history works for me in the long run, 
etc.' What seems to be an act of individual will is actually an act 
of faith, a travesty .... But when the oppressed class becomes the 
ruling class, responsible for the economic activity of the masses, 
then mechanistic determinism becomes a clear and present 
danger .... " 
It is therefore time, says Gramsci, to "render a funeral elegy 
to determinism, burying it with full honors." 
In area after area he shows concretely the distinction between 
vulgar determinism and Marxism. Read Politics and Ideology, 
which he begins: 
"We must fight theoretically as primitive infantilism the 
attempt to explain every fluctuation of politics and ideology as 
an immediate reflection of some change in the economic base 
of the structure." 
He goes on to point out in a brilliant passage that the contrary 
may be true, that 
" ... any specific political act may have been an error on the 
part of the administrators of the ruling classes, an error which 
historical development rectifies through the parliamentary 
'crisis' in the governments of the ruling classes. Mechanical 
historical materialism does not consider the possibility of error 
but assumes that every political act is determined by the eco-
nomic base of society .... " (Italics added-Ed.) 
To one of Gramsci's acute awareness of the importance of the 
superstructure in society the significance of art could not be mini-
mized. Literature and the theater, painting, music, all engaged 
his serious attention. Marx's proud motto from Terence, "Noth-
ing human is alien to me," applies equally to Gramsci. At the very 
time of the sharpest political struggles with rising fascism, of 
exhausting party activities, when he was busy with reports and 
analyses for the movement, busy with editorial responsibilities, 
writing political and polemical articles, he still found time for the 
theater and for literature. In some' two years he wrote over 150 
reviews for the party paper. 
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In jail the breadth of his interests continues. A single example 
is here quoted at length to give a flavor of his penetrating criticism. 
He sees a magazine article on Sinclair Lewis' Babbitt and he puts 
pen to paper: 
"It would be interesting to analyze the reasons for the great 
European success of Babbitt. It is not a great book; it is con-
structed too schematically and the mechanism shows. Its impor-
tance seems more cultural than artistic; the critique of mores 
prevails over art. The existence of a literary current of realism 
in America which begins to be critical of its mores is a cultural 
fact of great importance: it means that self-criticism is widen-
ing, that a new American civilization is being born, conscious 
of its strengths and its weaknesses. 
"The European intellectuals have already lost this function 
to a large extent: they no longer represent cultural self-criti-
cism, the self-criticism of the ruling class. They have either 
become direct agents of the ruling class or have separated into 
a little caste with no national roots. They laugh at Babbitt) his 
mediocrity, his naive stupidity, his standardized mentality. 
They don't even think of the question: do Babbitts exist in 
Europe? The fact is that the standardized petty bourgeois does 
exist in Europe, but on a regional and local scale, rather than 
on a national scale. The European Babbitts are historically in-
ferior to the American Babbitt; they are a national weakness 
whereas the American Babbitt is a national strength. 
" ... Babbitt is a philistine in a country in motion; the 
European petty bourgeoisie are philistines in conservative 
countries, rotting away in the swamps of a parochialism which 
preens itself as a great culture. . .. The plain fact is that no 
European writer has been able to present the European Bah 
bitt. The European writer is no longer capable of self-criticism 
and therefore he is an imbecile and a philistine-only he 
doesn't know it." 
It should be remembered that this was written twenty-five 
years ago. In the last few years leading American writers have 
been shying away from critical appraisal of American mores. If 
the drift sh~uld continue Gramsci's scathing criticism will apply 
to our writers. 
This critique of Babbitt shows a remarkable knowledge of 
American society. Gramsci is very interested in the United States, 
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as the strongest capitalist power, but he is interested in all aspects 
of it. His writings are peppered with jottings on our country, 
though they are of unequal weight. Here are two samples: 
"On American delinquency. It is usual to explain the growth 
of organized delinquency in the United States by reference to 
Prohibition and smuggling .... This is true. But another im· 
portant factor should be sought in the incredible brutality of 
the American police. The tough cop always creates the gangster. 
This factor has been very effective in pushing normal workers 
into professional delinquency." 
"On American philosophy. Study the position of Josiah 
Royce in the frame of the American view of life. What imp or· 
tance and what function has Hegelianism had in this view? Can 
Marxism expand in America and surpass empiricism.pragma. 
tism without a phase of Hegelianism?" 
This last is a most astonishingly penetrating insight. The reader 
will be well advised to read Gramsci slowly and to ruminate on 
what he has to say in the light of current arguments on socialism, 
communism, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, and so on. His 
paragraphs are packed with meaning. 
Gramsci was a Marxist theorist, that is, a theorist active in the 
society of his time. He had nothing in common with those intel· 
lectuals who believe themselves arbiters of history and consider 
it their mission to put, as Gramsci wittily said, "diapers on the 
world." He was in and of the class struggle. He was an intellectu-
ally sober and emotionally passionate activist, a devoted political 
leader of the working class, acutely conscious of the demands of 
the time. He knew that Italy was at a turning point of its history; 
either the working class moved forward to the assumption of 
power or reaction would win in the most violent and brutal 
manner. He wrote in 1920: 
"The actual phase of the class struggle in Italy is the phase 
which precedes one of two alternatives: either the working class 
conquers political power, opening the way to new modes of 
production and diSh"ibution that will permit a renewal of 
productivity; or an enormous reactionary victory of the proper-
tied class will take place. No violence will be overlooked 
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to subdue the industrial and agricultural workers and to sub-
ject them to servile labor: they will try to smash inexorably and 
irretrievably the organs of political struggle of the working 
class (the Socialist Party) and they will seek to incorporate the 
organs of economic struggle, the unions and the cooperatives, 
in the machine of the bourgeois state." 
This was written before the Italian ruling class had fully 
formulated its program in the nascent Fascist Party. The insight 
of Gramsci was to be dreadfully vindicated in the terrible suffer-
ing of the Italian people in the two decades that culminated in the 
catastrophe of World Wat II. 
They were terrible times, and Gramsd was conscious of his 
responsibilities, conscious too of the sharpness of the struggle, the 
need for hardness and he had an explicit awareness of the psycho-
logical toll involved, the resulting cruelty and a degree of de-
humanization. There is an anecdote of Lenin listening to music 
and coming out muttering that p.e mustn't go again because it is 
too affecting and makes for "softness" and that it is no time for 
softness or the rabid bourgeoisie will destroy everything. A similar 
incident is recorded by Gramsci in one of his letters. He writes of 
his fight with an old, beloved professor: 
"In November, 1920, I wrote against Professor Cosmo a 
violent and cruel article such as can only get written at a 
critical moment in the political struggle ... our cordial per-
sonal relations of teacher and ex-student were broken." 
He goes on to write a moving tribute: 
"I conserve of Professor Cosmo a memory full of affection and 
I would say of veneration were it not that this word does not 
adequately express my feelings. He was, and I believe him still 
to be, a man of great sincerity and moral stature, with many 
streaks of that native ingenuity (originality) which is often a 
characteristic of great erudite scholars." 
A sensitive man, Gramsci, a great man, strengthened by the tens 
of thousands of fellow-workers whose tenacity, loyalty, and self-
sacrifice he recorded for the future: 
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"The Communist Party today is the only institution that can 
seriously confront the various Christian churches ... the Com-
munist is certainly not inferior to the Christian of the cata-
combs. On the contrary. The ineffable end which Christianity 
promised its champions was a sufficient justification for hero-
ism, for martyrdom, for sanctity. For those who believe in a 
heavenly reward and eternal beatitude, the great human forces 
of will and character do not need to come into full play. 
"But look at the Communist worker. Week after week, month 
after month, year after year, after eight dehumanizing hours at 
the machine, he goes on disinterestedly to give eight hours to 
his party, his union, his cooperative. In the history of mankind, 
he is a much greater man than the slave or the artisan who defied 
all dangers to go to the clandestine prayer meeting. Likewise 
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht are greater individuals 
than the great saints of Christ." 
The tribute that Gramsci pays to Rosa Luxemburg and Karl 
Liebknecht is fully applicable to himself. Consider this man, for 
ten years in Mussolini's jails. Even in the most humane prisons, 
the physical and psychological pressures of imprisonment are a 
terrible ordeal; what must it have been like in a fascist jail? Add 
the burden of pain and fatigue as tuberculosis ravages the organ-
ism; insomnia, hemmorhages, faintings, deliriums. In August, 
1931, the most serious symptoms appear and by March, 1933, the 
first complete physical breakdown. He recovers somewhat and 
continues writing 'until 1935, when he can no longer work as the 
disease burns the last remaining reserves of the body. 
Watch him at work, day after day, fighting with the penal ad-
ministration and with the government up to Mussolini himself 
for the right to get a few books, a few magazines. Denied any 
Marxist writings, he has to quote from memory, paraphrase, use 
in his study of 6roce only what Croce gives of Marx, in other 
words make his argument on Croce's own grounds. He has to 
think of the censorship, avoid the well-known words and names, 
so he develops a code: Marxism is called the philosophy of praxis 
(from the Greek, to do; practice); Marx is called the founder of 
the philosophy of praxis and Engels the second founder; Lenin 
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is the greatest modern theorist of praxis; Capital becomes the 
critique of political economy, and so on. 
Yet he continues writing; an assiduous, incredible labor. How 
the greatness of humanity is reaffirmed by the tenacity of his will, 
particularly in the last few years as he writes with wasted body, 
death a hovering companion. The enormous effort is reflected in 
the physical act of writing. The first notebooks were neat, in a 
clear and regular calligraphy. At the end, the handwriting wavers, 
wanders, is erratic and weak. But the thinking remains lucid, 
vigorous, trenchant, while the style continues poised and pro-
fessional, spiced with humor, irony, and a genial twist of phrase. 
Protest grew in Europe and his release was sought by the most 
eminent men of the time, including such diverse figures as Romain 
Rolland and the Archbishop of Canterbury. Mussolini was forced 
to transfer Gramsci to hospitals in Formia and Rome. But it was 
too late. Gramsci died on April 27, 1937. He died as fascist troops 
and Nazi squadrons poured into Spain. Nazism and fascism 
marched arrogantly forward, everywhere triumphant. Yet eight 
years later, as spring came again to Italy, the carcass of Mussolini 
hung by its heels at a gas station in Milan. 
Gramsci's thought remains, and Gramsci's example. 
New York City 
October I5, I957 
CARL MARZANI 
Translator' s Note 
Gramsci's last volume appeared in 1954 and by the following 
year Cameron Associates had considered a translation. For various 
reasons the work was postponed until recently leg injuries forced 
the translator into bed and he began to work. Soon after, it be-
came known that a volume of Gramsci's selected works would 
be brought out by International Publishers, so the translator 
stopped. 
Nevertheless the material already translated, mostly the philo-
sophic notes, was so interesting and many points so relevant to 
American problems th~t it seemed useful to edit it and publish 
it. The reader should remember constantly that these are notes 
written in jail, with the facts often taken from memory, the 
formulations unpolished, the contents of unequal importance. In 
a real sense, this is Gramsci thinking out loud. 
The translator has felt no compunction in removing a few 
footnotes and a few paragraphs of esoteric references which 
would be meaningless to the American public. Some paragraphs 
were cut as repetitious, some terminology rephrased for better 
comprehension, and coded expressions, like praxis for Marxism, 
were "decoded." 
I; 
Preliminaries to a Study of Philosophy 
We must eliminate the widespread prejudice that philosophy 
is extremely difficult because it is the product of professional 
intellectuals. We must show people that "all men are philoso· 
phers," that every single human being has a "spontaneous phi. 
losophy" whose characteristics can be studied. This philosophy, 
which no one can avoid, is contained: 
1. In language itself, for words are not only grammatical tools • 
and symbols-they embody as well an ensemble of notions and 
concepts; 
2. In common sense, and what we may call "good sense," that 
aspect of common sense which most relies on causality; 
3. In the popular religions and in the entire systems of supersti-
tions, beliefs, opinions, ways of thinking and acting covered by 
the term "folklore." 
Ed. Note: Gramsci is intensely interested in what and how 
the mass of the people thinks. He takes for granted that how 
people earn their living is important; he takes for granted 
that it influences their thinking., but he wants to know actu-
ally how they think and what . they think. He therefore 
sketches a line of attack for a study of their mentality. 
This approach is of some interest to Americans who wish 
to engage in p'oliticsJ since there cannot be any political strat-
egy or any political activity that will amount to anything if it 
isn't based) inter alia, on a knowledge of the mentality of the 
class enemy, one's own class, and its allies. As an example 
of analysis of middle classes see Whyte, The Organization 
Man, Simon &- Schuster, I956, and as a modest approach to 
working class thinkingJ Swados' essay, uThe Myth of the 
Happy Worker," The Nation, Aug. I7, I957. 
We establish then that everyone is, at the least, an "uncon-
scious" philosopher since the language itself contains elements 
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of some world view. Now we move on to a second level, the level 
of consciousness and criticism, and we pose this question: Is it 
better to "think" in a disjointed and sporadic manner, through 
ideas imposed by the environment, or is it better to think critically, 
examining and rejecting ideas through the conscious activity of 
one's own brain? 
Since every person is a member of some social grouping, the 
first alternative means that elements of a world view typical of 
that group are imposed on the individual. That social group can 
be as large as .one's own village or province or it can be as narrow 
as a single "wise" patriarch or local Hwitch" with magic powers. 
The imposed ideas may have originated in the "intellectual 
activity" of the parish priest or that of a local petty intellectual 
pickled in his own stupidity. 
In the second alternative, conscious critical examination and 
acceptance of one's own world view mean that the individual's 
own brain chooses his sphere of activity; consciously participates 
in world history, and becomes as it were a guide to his own self-
development. 
Several observations are germane to the above discussion. As 
we have said, one always belongs to some social group, and pre-
cisely to that group where people share substantially the same way 
of thinking and working. One is always a conformist in some con-
formism, one is always as it were a "collective man," a person 
within a social group. The question therefore is to determine or 
ascertain the historical character of that conformism, of that social 
group. If a person's world view is not coherent but disjointed and 
sporadic, then one develops a bizarre and capricious personality. 
Such a personality will have within it elements of the caveman 
alongside the most modern scientific concepts, remnants of paro-
chial prejudices from past historical epochs, as well as intuitions 
of a rising philosophy suitable to the entire human species, united 
throughout the world. 
To criticize one's own world view, therefore, means to make it 
coherent and unified, and to develop it to the point reached by 
the most progressive thought anywhere in the world. Such critique 
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demands the criticism of any past philosophy that has left its 
mark in the popular mind and in the popular philosophy. The 
accumulation of remnants of past philosophies in contemporary 
popular thought is enormous, yet an inventory must be attempted. 
Above all, it is clear that the beginning of a critique of one's own 
world view entails a consciousness of one's own self. You must 
"Know thyself," but know thyself as the product of a historical 
process. 
Ed. Note: Here again it seems clear that Gramsci has put 
his finger on a problem of our times. In Marxist circles self-
criticism has too often been taken to mean discussion of what 
caused some specific error~ or, at a slightly deeper level~ the 
examination and castigation of such superficial character-
istics as vanity~ rudeness~ laziness~ etc. Gramsci will have 
nothing to do with this. He demands that a Marxist study him-
self~ understand himself as the product of an entire historical 
process. Thus American Marxists might more easily find 
within themselves large elements of pragmatism~ male su-
premacy, chauvinism~ facile optimism~ and so on, which are 
endemic in our society. Perhaps such an examination might 
show to many that their Marxist world view was not as co.-
herent as they believed; perhaps even that it was not there. 
Might not the result be a quality of tolerance~ an awareness 
of fallibility without paralysis of the will? 
It is impossible to study the content of a philosophy or culture 
without studying its history. One cannot have a critically co-
herent world view without knowing its historical development, 
its connections and conflicts with other world views. 
A coherent world view is related to actual problems posed by 
reality. It is stultifying to think about the concrete present by 
modes of thought developed in the past to deal with quite dif-
ferent problems, particularly if those problems are completely 
out of date. Such "anachronistic" thinking cannot make for a 
unified personality. In social groups where such thinking is preva-
lent, the most developed modern ideas will go hand in hand with 
the most backward social positions. The result is to prevent the 
historical autonomy of that group. 
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Here is a further thought on language in relation to philosophy. 
If it is true that every language contains elements of a given 
world view, then it follows that from any language the complexity 
of the world view implicit in it can be deduced. The person who 
speaks only a dialect or understands imperfectly his national 
tongue will necessarily have a more restricted world view-pa-
rochial, fossilized, anachronistic-as cempared to the great cur-
rents of thought prevalent in the world. His interests will be 
extremely narrow, tied to his most immediate economic problems. 
While it is not always possible to learn foreign languages in order 
to be in touch with other cultures, it is at least necessary to know 
well one's own language. A great culture may be translated into 
the language of another great culture since they are both rich and 
complex and capable of worldwide expression. A dialect obviously 
cannot do this. 
Ed. Note: Gramsci is thinking here p'rimarily of Italy, 
where substantial portions of the population are still speak-
ing dialects which are incomprehensible to the rest of the 
population. In some areas even comparatively close villages 
cannot understand each other's dialects. Obviously the ig-
norance is enormous and the difficulties of teaching history, 
economics, etc., are appalling. 
But Gramsci's thought has an insight of value into Ameri-
can problems. While our national language is extremely 
widespread and dialects are not a major problem (though 
they do exist), and while education is widespread, yet the 
leveling down of language in the popular press and comic 
books, and the erosion of intellectual standards in the schools, 
are resulting in a population which, slowly but perceptibly, 
is being placed in intellectual blinkers. Coupled with the per-
vasive pragmatism of our culture, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to teach and understand Marxism. It is also the rea-
son for the paucity of first-rate Marxist intellectuals in our 
country. 
One more observation. A new culture is created not only by 
individual "original" discoveries, but also by the wide propaga-
tion of those truths which have already been discovered. These 
truths must be "socialized" as it were, so they can give rise to 
actions and be woven into the growing structure of a new moral 
and intellectual order. That large groups of people should be led 
to think coherently about their present problems is a much more 
important "philosophic" fact than the discovery of a new truth 
which remains the property of a small group of intellectuals . 
• • • 
The relation of common sense and religion to philosophy. A 
philosophy is an intellectual, coherent system. Neither religion 
nor common sense (the two do not coincide, for religion is an ele-
ment of common sense) ... can constitute an intellectual system 
because neither can be made unified and coherent even within 
the individual consciousness, let alone collective consciousness. 
In the past and within limits, coherence and unity were forced 
"authoritatively" in religion, never by the "free" play of the mind. 
Sociologically, the problem of religion is to achieve unity be-
tween a world view and a controlling standard of behavior. Such 
unity can, however, be called an ideology, or directly "politics" 
as well as religion. 
Philosophy in general does not exist; what exists are different 
philosophies, world views, and one always chooses among specific 
philosophies. How is this choice made? Is it explicit, conscious, 
purely intellectual, or is the choice made in a vague, much more 
complex way? Haven't we often seen, for example, a contradiction 
between an individual's intellectual concepts and his acts, his 
standard of behavior? Which, then, should we say is his real world 
view: that which he asserts logically or that which he shows im-
plicit in his actions? Furthermore, human action is always a so-
cial action, it is a "political" action. Can't we say therefore that 
a person's philosophy is always wholly contained in his politics? 
The coexistence of two world views, often contradictory, one 
expressed in words and the other shown through actions, is not 
always due to bad faith. Bad faith may be a true and satisfactory 
explanation for single individuals or even small groups, but it 
is neither true nor satisfactory as an explanation when this con-
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tradiction is found in large numbers of people. Then this contra-
diction must be the expression of deeper contradictions at a 
historical and sociological level. 
Ed. Note: This passage has a poignant relevance for Ameri-
can p·rogressives. Too many uMarxists" jump automatically 
to conclusions of bad faith on the part of fellow-progressives, 
workers and allies of the professional and middle classes 
whenever they see contradictions between words and deeds. 
This udevil theory" of history creates political havoc among 
friends and allies, but it has equally disastrous consequences 
even in dealing with the class enemy. Contradictions may be 
due to bad faith, but it isn't always so and only the most con-
crete analysis of a concrete situation will show which is which. 
In another connection later on, Gramsci shows that deter-
ministic thinking does not allow for the possibility of Uerror" 
on the part of the ruling class. The ((devil theory," itself a 
deterministic concept, does not allow for Uerrors" arising out 
of the complexities of ideology. 
Such contradictions reflect the following: A social class has its 
own world view but not as yet consciously. This world view is 
shown only in action, when the class moves as an organic whole, 
and since this happens only sporadically the world view is mani-
fested sporadically. This is one reason why the class is not yet 
conscious of its own world view. However, because of social and 
intellectual subordination, this class borrows a world view from 
another class and asserts this borrowed world view in words 
although in action a con tradictory world view is manifested. 
It must be remembered that this subordinate class does believe 
in the borrowed world view because' it does follow it in action 
in "normal times," that is, when the class is subordinated, divided, 
and does not act as an organic whole. This discussion shows that 
we cannot divide philosophy from politics, and in fact the choice 
and the, critique of a world view are a political act. 
Ed. Note: The imposition and fostering of a pragmatic 
philosophy on the population (including the workers) in 
England and America are a good example of a uborrowed" 
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world view. It is against this phenomenon that we must con-
sider the current widespread accusations that the American 
working class is becoming corrupt and ((middle class' in its 
attitude. The fact is that in "normal" times7 times of not 
too great economic and social stress7 the working class is al-
ways "middle class" in ideology. It is in times of stress that 
the working class moves autonomously, not according to its 
((borrowed" ideas but according to its needs. 
We must understand how at any time there exist many systems 
and currents of philosophy, how they are born, how they are 
propagated and diffused, why the propagation follows certain 
directions~ splits and breaks up along certain "fracture" lines, 
etc. We must systematize coherently our own thought and intui-
tion of the world and do so critically rather than pedantically. 
Such an elaboration can be made only within the framework of 
the history of philosophy, which shows how thought has developed 
over the centuries and what a great collective effort has been 
necessary to achieve our present way of thinking. Contemporary 
thought summarizes all our past history, including . errorS' and 
hallucinations. Even errors which were made in the past, and 
corrected at that time, can and do reproduce themselves today 
and must be corrected anew. 
The popular ideas on philosophy may be sought in the idioms 
of popular language. For example, the idea implicit in the phrase 
"to take things philosophically.'~ When examined, this idea is 
not to be lightly dismissed. It is true that it contains an appeal 
to resignation and patience, and is often used to that end. Yet, 
more important, it would seem to me, is the appeal to reflection 
and to the examination of things. The idea is implied that reason 
is effective, that what happens is ultimately rational. Rational 
events can be :faced and dealt with by concentrating one's own 
rational forces and not letting oneself be dragged along by in-
stinctive impulses. 
Popular writers use similar expressions and idioms and when-
ever the word "philosophy" or "philosophically" is used there 
is always the connotation of a concept of necessity which goes 
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beyond bestial and elementary passions. Such is the healthy nu-
cleus in common sense, what we may term "good sense," which 
merits development to become unified and coherent. Thus it 
seems to me that it is not possible to separate what is called "sci-
entific philosophy" from that "vulgar philosophy" which is only 
a disjointed aggregate of ideas and opinions. 
This point, the continuum from common sense to the highest 
philosophy, poses the fundamental problem of all world views 
which have penetrated an entire society, namely, how to maintain 
the ideological unity throughout the social body from the most 
ignorant to the most sophisticated. It has been the strength of all 
religions, and particularly of the Catholic Church, that they have 
recognized the necessity of doctrinal unity throughout the entire 
community, and have fought against the separation of higher 
intellectual strata from the lower ones. 
The Catholic Church has struggled tenaciously to prevent the 
formal development of two religions, one for the "intellectuals" 
and one for the "simple souls." This struggle has seriously in-
convenienced the Catholic Church, particularly as the long-range 
trend in modern culture is to undermine and corrode all religions. 
In resisting this trend, the clergy has shown a noteworthy organiza-
tional ability, especially in the field of culture. Within its own 
milieus the Catholic Church has stabilized the relations between 
the intellectuals and the average people. The Jesuits have been 
the major architects of this equilibrium. They have given the 
Church a certain progressive orientation to keep abreast of sci-
entific and philosophic developments but with a rhythm so slow 
and methodic that the mass of the faithful do not perceive the 
changes. At the same time, these changes are real and offend the 
die-hard Catholics. 
Ed. Note: An excellent recent example of this strategy of the 
Catholic Church is the encyclical on evolution. The Church 
could no longer deny evolution without seriously crippling 
Catholic scientists and the science departments of its univer-
sities. The Church therefore has giver its official approval to 
evolution-but only up to Adam and Eve! From Adam and 
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Eve all humanity has descended. Thus the local priest can 
tell the faithful that we are all descended from Adam and 
Eve, implicitly rejecting evolution (of course we're not de-
scended from monkeys!) while evolution is taught at Notre 
Dame. This kind of thing infuriates the die-hard Catholic 
Church in Spain and pleases the opportunistic Church in 
the U.S.A. 
One of the major weaknesses of immanent philosophies· has 
been precisely their inability to forge an ideological unity be-
tween the intellectuals and the people. In the history of Western 
civilization this has been exemplified by the failure of the Ren-
aissance to attract the masses of the people and in part also by 
the failure of the Reformation in attracting Catholic intellectuals. 
Another example of the weakness of immanent philosophies 
is shown in education. Not one such philosophy has been able to 
develop a system of philosophical education which could com-
pete with religion in the eclucation of children. The result is 
that nonreligious pedagogues (most of them atheists) have con-
ceded the teaching of religion by default. There has even de-
veloped a pseudo-historical justification for this: the sophism 
that since religion is the philosophy of the childhood of man, it 
has to be repeated in each contemporary childhood. 
Idealist philosophy in general has shown itself indifferent to 
cultural movements of "going to the people." Such movements 
could succeed only if there were a unity between intellectuals 
and the people such as should exist between theory and practice. 
If intellectuals are organically of the people, they can develop 
and make coherent those problems and principles which the 
people are setting forth in their practical activity. Then a politi-
cal and social unity would be constituted. 
This is only a restatement of the fundamental problem of the 
• Ed. Note: Immanent is the opposite of transcendental. Immanent phi-
losophies are based on men's minds and/or the material world. Transcen-
dental philosophies are based on God. Most Christian sects are transcen-
dental; materialist philosophies are immanent. Idealist philosophies can be 
either. I would consider Berkeley a transcendentalist and Kant an immanent 
philosopher even though Kant to avoid solipsism was forced to bring in 
God at the end of his inquiry to underwrite his philosophic system. 
unity of a philosophical system throughout the social group. A 
philosophical movement can be a specialized culture for restricted 
groups of intellectuals or it can be a movement which never for-
gets to remain in contact with the people while at the same time de-
veloping a coherently scientific system superior to common sense. 
In this very contact with the people such a philosophical move-
ment finds the source of its problems. Only through such a contact 
can a philosophy become historical, be cleansed of individual 
idiosyncrasies, become "life." 
It may be useful to probe a little deeper in the relation between 
philosophy and common sense to understand the movement from 
one level to another at any given time. In philosophy the char-
acteristics of individual thought tend to predominate. In common 
sense these characteristics are dispersed. You get the general 
thought of a given epoch in a given popular environment. How-
ever, every philosophy is to some extent the common sense of a 
group of intellectuals, however small. 
We need to develop a philosophy which has the possibilities of 
wide diffusion because it is implicit in practical activity, give it 
the clarity and coherence of individual philosophies, and then 
have it become a widespread "common sense" at a much 
higher level. All this is impossible if one does not feel the neces-
sity of maintaining contact with the people. Marxism should be 
such a philosophy. 
Ed. Note: The discussion of the rise of intellectuals from 
the ranks of its peop'le is becoming relevant in the United 
States to an ever increasing degree, particularly in the trade 
unions. The CIO from the beginning was widely staffed by 
intellectuals because of the combination of free publication, 
education, substantial opportunities at the college levels, and 
the depression which restricted avenues of emp'loyment. 
Many of the unions were led by intellectuals, some formally 
educated, others self-educated-Bridges, Carey, Selly, Rel-
stein, the Reuther brothers, Emspak, Flaxner, Goldblatt, etc. 
Today the process is continuing in the staffing of old-line 
AFL unions as well. At the same time, however, by the pe-
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culiar quirk ot pragmatism on the American scene) all the 
intellectuals in the labor movement would rather be caught 
dead than admit it. Worse) most ot them turn their backs on 
a systematic intellectualization of the secondary leadership 
in their unions, looking to educating broader and broader 
strata. Men like Bridges ot the Longshoremen, Gorman of 
the Meatcutters) Emspak ot the Electrical Workers, Reuther 
of the Auto Workers) are widely read) cultured men. Yet their 
intellectual impact on their unions is minimal. Nor is this a 
result ot political conservatism; left) center) and right op'erate 
on an implicit) often explicit) basis of anti-intellectualism. A 
different attitude is being built up in the U A Wand the U E 
particularly) but the p'rocess is slow. 
Let us now look at the philosophy of Marxism in the light of 
this discussion. Marxism seems like a philosophy of intellectuals 
separated from common people and from common sense. Since 
Marxism supersedes previous philosophies and modes of thought, 
it has at the beginning a polemical and critical stance and must 
be a criticism of common sense. Yet, at the same time, from the 
beginning, it also bases itself on common sense in showing that 
every person is in fact a philosopher, that philosophy is not neces-
sarily a narrow specialized science, and that Marxism in particu-
lar is not introducing a brand new science in every person's life 
but rather wishes to develop, make conscious, and make critical 
an already existing activity. 
Marxism must be also a critique of individual philosophers 
because philosophy has been developed through particularly 
gifted individuals. ,Actually we can consider these individuals as 
nodal points in the development of common sense, at least the 
common sense of the cultivated strata of society and through 
them to the popular common sense. Th.erefore a study of phi-
losophy must show synthetically how problems arise in the de-
velopment of a culture. That culture is only partly reflected in the 
history of philosophy, yet in the absence of a history of common 
sense (which can never be written for lack of data) the history of 
philosophy remains the greatest source of study. Philosophy 
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must criticize the old problems, show their current value, if any, 
or their significance in the past as part of a chain, pose the new 
current problems or the current validity of the old. 
In Marxism, as in Catholicism, the unity between the "higher" 
philosophy and common sense is assured by "politics." But the 
difference between the two world views is enormous and funda-
mental. Marxism lifts up the people; Catholicism presses down 
on the intellectuals. In Catholicism, whenever the development of 
history separates the intellectuals from the people, the Church 
cannot heal this rift by lifting the people to the level of the in-
tellectuals. The Church doesn't even try to; economically and 
ideologically the task is beyond her. The Church heals the break 
by imposing an iron discipline on the intellectuals to prevent 
an ideological differentiation which would be catastrophic and 
irreparable by resulting in two religions. In the past such breaks 
in the community of the faithful were healed by popular mass 
movements which were brought into line within the Church by 
strong personalities who created various religious orders-St. 
Dominic, St. Francis, etc.· 
The Counter-Reformation sterilized this upsurge of popular 
forces within the Church. The Company of Jesus was the last 
great religious order and was designed precisely to stifle popular 
movements. Authoritarian and reactionary in origin, it has op-
erated by repression and maneuver, "diplomacy." Its birth marked 
the ossification of the Catholic organism. The new orders that 
have appeared after the Jesuits have had little "religious" sig-
nificance and a great deal of "disciplinary" significance. They 
were either ramifications of the Jesuits, or have come under their 
control, serving as political instruments rather than renovating 
forces in a religious development. Catholicism has become 
"Jesuitism." In modern times the Church has created no great 
• The heretical movements of the Middle Ages based on the social conflicts 
created by the rise of the towns were simultaneous reactions to the politics 
of the Church and to Scholastic philosophy. They were often hemmed in by 
the popular religious movements and taken back into the Church through 
the formation of Mendicant Orders and a new religious unity. 
religious orders, but rather a political party, Christian De-
mocracy.· 
The position of Marxism is the opposite of the Catholic posi-
tion. Marxism does not try to keep the people within the confines 
of their primitive philosophies. It leads them from common sense 
to a higher view of life. Marxism insists on the necessity of contact 
between the intellectuals and the masses of people not in order 
to limit scientific activity and achieve unity at a low level, but 
rather to build an intellectual bloc which will make politically 
possible the higher intellectual development of the people. 
Ed. Note: After the revelations and upheavals in the So-
cialist world, the ideas of Gramsci on the contrast between 
Catholicism and Marxism seem nai've. Many observers would 
argue that there is no essential difference between the two, 
that both imp'ose an iron discipline on intellectuals and both 
stifle the spirit of inquiry and the spirit of artistic and sci-
entific freedom. Many progressives in America have ac-
cepted this view and are profoundly disoriented. Many ask 
whether socialism is not by its nature totalitarian. 
Yet a closer analysis of Soviet development, including its 
dark and somber areas, shows a great correspondence to 
Gramsci's analysis. The enormous educational achievements 
of the U.S.S.R. designed to lift an entire p'opulation from 
the cultural level of the Middle Ages to that of the Twentieth 
Century are beyond dispute. The Soviet Union today has one 
of the finest public educational systems in the world in terms 
of coverage of population, lack of discrimination, educa-
tional standards, social status of teachers, and so on. Their 
scientists are among the best and Professor E. Teller, the 
"father" of the H-Bomb, after a recent visit to the U.S.S.R., 
stated flatly that in a decade their science would lead the 
world. Fortune Magazine of February, I957, acknowledging 
• Wickham Steed in his Memoirs tells the anecdote of a Cardinal explaining 
to a pro·Catholic English Protestant that the miracles of Saint Gennaro 
(patron saint of Naples) are articles of faith for the Neapolitan populace but 
not for Catholic intellectuals. Whereupon the Protestant asks, "But aren't 
you all Catholic Christians?" And the Cardinal answers, "I am a 'prelate' 
which means an office-holder, a 'politician' of the Church of Rome." 
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the world leadership of Soviet scientists in many areas, at-
tributed it to the freedom of Soviet scientists in contrast to 
other areas of Soviet life so that the brilliant students 
gravitated to science. All this in forty years. Whereas after 
2,1)00 years the Catholic Church is still one of the most power-
ful world-wide forces for intellectual backwardness of the 
people. Where the Church is strongest (Spain, prewar 
Hungary and Poland, Slovakia, etc.) there education of the 
people is at its lowest. 
Isn't it possible that the very education of the Soviet 
population, transforming the country psychologically as the 
industrialization has transformed it physically, is one of the 
root causes of the present evolution of Soviet politics, at 
home and abroad'! 
The average man acts practically to achieve certain ends. To 
the extent that he is successful he has to some degree shaped the 
world around him-his activity has changed the world. But his 
success is in direct relation to his understanding of himself and 
the world around him. Vice versa, his activity is a form of knowl-
edge of the world around him in so far as he is changing it. Yet 
the average man has no theoretical consciousness of this. In fact, 
his theoretical consciousness may be, and often is, in contradic-
tion to his actions; one may almost say that he has two theoretical 
consciousnesses (or, perhaps, one contradictory consciousness). 
One consciousness is implicit in his actions which are uniting him 
with all his coworkers in the practical transformation of reality; 
the other is the explicit consciousness, the verbal one, which he 
has inherited from the past and which he has uncritically ac-
cepted. This "verbal" consciousness is also responsible for actions. 
It is tied to a given social group which influences his ethical be-
havior, the direction and exercise of his will. The existence of 
these two consciousnesses, this contradiction, may reach a point 
that it prevents any action, any decision, any choice. It may cre-
ate a state of moral and political passivity. 
Critical understanding of one's own self takes place through a 
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struggle of political "hegemonies,"· first in the field of ethics, 
then in politics, to reach a higher understanding of reality. The 
consciousness of belonging to a given hegemony is the first phase 
of a further self-consciousness in which theory and practice are 
finally united. Therefore even the unity of theory and practice 
is not a mechanical given fact but a historical process. That is 
why we have stressed that in political development the concept 
of hegemony is a great philosophical step forward for mankind. 
This concept includes and presupposes an intellectual unity and 
an ethic which conforms to reality. 
Ed. Note: The moral and political passivity of many pro-
gressives in the United States and elsewhere illustrates this 
discussion7 but with a reverse twist. That is, one can argue 
that, among progressives, Marxism is the "verbal" conscious· 
ness while the consciousness shown in acts is idealist, prag. 
matist, or what have you. As a matter of fact, in many cases 
both consciousnesses are becoming explicit. Ruling class 
concepts are striving against Marxist concepts in the minds 
of men. A good illustration is the discussion over ends and 
means. The ruling class loves to ask, ((Does the end Justify 
the means?" and all they are up to is to stop opponents before 
they get well started. They set up absolutes like the Ten Com· 
mandments and then try to prevent unions by calling the 
leadership atheists, or break up a strike because someone 
is killed or prevent socialism by saying that the means used 
are evil, inhuman, etc. Meanwhile throughout history the 
ruling classes have merrily gone on with wars, killing, force, 
violence, breaking every rule they ever made, all quite 
((legally" and ((officially." 
Actually the dispute over ends and means is artificial. Only 
the end can justify the means. Hegel says, what else can 
justify the means except the end? The end to be achieved is 
subject to ethical judgments; is it right or wrong, good or evil? 
But the only valid question about means is: are they causally 
• By "hegemony" Gramsci means moral leadership of a social group 
through the sum total of its concepts, actions, and methods. He considers that 
Lenin sharpened and developed this concept and gave it a concrete expression 
in Bolshevism. 
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correct} are they efficient, will they bring about the desired 
result; are they necessary and sufficient? 
In... the more recent developments of Marxism we are still at 
the initial phase of deepening the concept of the unity of theory 
and practice. Remnants of mechanism remain in ideas such as 
theory as a "complement" to practice or as "ancillary" to practice. 
This concept too can be looked at as an aspect of the political 
problem of intellectuals. 
The awareness of the unity of theory and practice is a histori-
cal development of critical self-consciousness. This entails the de-
velopment of a "leading group" of intellectuals within the mass 
of people. The mass of people cannot become independent and 
autonomous without organizing itself, and organization is im-
possible without organizers and directors, without intellectuals. 
A group within the mass must develop the theoretical concepts 
necessary for development including most particularly the unity 
of theory and practice . . 
This process of developing a group of intellectuals is long and 
difficult. It is full of contradictions, of advances and retreats, of 
people coming together, disbanding, regrouping, and so on. In 
this process the loyalty of the mass of people to its own intellec-
tuals is sorely tested. And it should be noted that loyalty and 
discipline are the form of the agreement of the people with the 
intellectuals, and the form of their collaboration in the develop-
ing historical process. 
"Leadership" develops within the people dialectically. As the 
group of leaders develops intellectually quantitatively and qual-
itatively it is inextricably connected with the people. Every leap 
forward of the intellectuals toward a widening of their horizons 
and toward greater complexities has a relation to the cultural 
level of the people which also rises, via individuals and small 
groupings, toward the level of the intellectuals. 
Again and again, however, in this process, the intellectuals lose 
contact with the people. There is a lag, a separation, and therefore 
the impression arises, that theory is complementary to practice, 
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that it is subordinate. At such times, to insist on the primacy of 
"practice" is to show that the historical development is in a primi-
tive phase where the production relations of a society are still 
changing and an adequate superstructure has not fully developed. 
Ed. Note: The discussion above may help to understand 
one of the factors in the upheaval in Hungary~ the break be-
tween the leadership and the people. Production relations 
were changing rapidly; the superstructure was not adequate. 
To say that economic problems were serious in Hungary is 
to beg the question: the proper contact between leadership 
and people would have prevented the up'heaval~ as Poland 
shows. It was the hypocrisy and arrogance of the leadership 
which in part fueled the flames. This discussion illuminates 
another observation of Gramsci quoted in the introduction: 
ilin the phase of state power all the superstructure must be 
developed~ or the state itself may disintegrate." 
In further discussing the unity of theory and practice we should 
take a look at political parties in the modern world. Political 
parties develop and propagate the ethics and politics cor-
responding to specific world views. Their role in this context 
is of the greatest significance. They function almost as "experi-
mental laboratories" in the historical testing of world views. In-
dividuals adhere to these parties so that the parties act as screen-
ing devices through which the mass of the people is divided among 
various world views. This screening takes place both in the field 
of practical activities and in the field of theory, separately and in 
various mixtures. The more the specific world view is vitally 
and radically new, the more it is antagonistic to older world views 
the tighter is the relationship between theory and practice as 
the screening takes place. It may be said that political parties are 
the developers of new ideologies, that they are the crucibles 
wherein takes place the unity of theory and practice on a historical 
scale. 
It should now be easy to understand why a working class party 
should be formed through the adherence of individuals and not 
through the unions. [Gramsci has in mind the British Labor 
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Party, which is composed in both ways.-Ed. Note] A party must 
be composed of individuals who know what they are doing and 
why if it is to direct organically the entire mass of the people. 
Such direction cannot take place by old methods but by in-
novations in organizations and procedures, and innovations can-
not become the property of the people except through the teach-
ing of a leadership group. These leaders at all levels must have 
some consciousness of the world view implicit in the people's 
practical activity, must have some coherence in their thinking 
and a will which is clear and committed. 
Discussions of the concept of the unity of theory and practice 
still suffer from the over-all vulgarization of Marxism. One can 
still sense deterministic, fatalistic, mechanistic elements which 
have created an "ideological aroma" around Marxism, making 
it a kind of religion. We can see how this came about, and is even 
historically justifiable, given the "subordinate" character of the 
social groups which accepted Marxism. 
When one does not have initiative in a struggle the struggle 
becomes identified with a series of defeats. In such a situation 
mechanical determinism becomes a formidable morale builder, 
making for cohesion, patience, and obstinate perseverance. The 
rationale is well known: "I have been defeated for the moment 
but the logic of things works for me in the long run, etc." We 
can understand and sympathize but the fact is that in such a view 
the act of will becomes a travesty, becomes an act of faith in the 
assured rationality of history. In form, it is nothing but an em-
pirical and primitive type of passionate fatalism which seems 
simply a substitute for similar concepts in religions like predesti-
nation, Providence, etc. It should, however, be observed that even 
under such conditions the will is acting directly on the "logic of 
things," but it is doing so implicitly, almost ashamed of itself, so 
that the consciousness is veiled, contradictory, lacks critical impact, 
etc. 
But when the "subordinate" group becomes the ruling group 
responsible for the economic activity of the people, then mech-
anistic Marxism becomes at some point a clear and present danger. 
:/ 
Ed. Note: This is perhaps the most prophetic insight of 
Gramsci, as the events of Poland and Hungary have shown. 
This sentence written thirty years ago has the immediacy of 
current events. Wrong ideas always do harm, but wrong ideas 
plus power can be catastrophic. 
When such a group rules it is imperative that it change its 
mode of thinking because life itself has changed. The "logic of 
things" is no longer absolute; it has limits and restrictions. Why? 
Because it can be acted upon. If the "subordinate group" felt 
itself yesterday a plaything of outside forces, this ruling group 
today has power and initiative; yesterday it was irresponsible, 
today it is active and independent. But even this formulation is 
wrong, for is it ever true that even yesterday it was an irrespon-
sible plaything? Certainly not. Fatalism is the weak.1ing's garb 
for a real will. Hence we must always show the futility of a mech-
anistic determinism. We can understand it as a naive philosophy 
for the average man, and, as philosophy, an element of strength 
for him. But if it is accepted by intellectuals as a coherent and 
critical philosophy, then it leads to passivity and a kind of im-
becilic self-sufficiency, whether the intellectuals are subordinate 
or ruling. We must always remember that within the people, 
however downtrodden, there are elements which are responsible 
and developing and that their philosophy anticipates the future 
not only theoretically but in their daily activities. 
The proof that a mechanistic conception is the philosophy of 
subordinate groups is shown by an analysis of Christianity. Under 
given historical conditions Christianity is a "necessity" for the 
mass€s, giving them a means of expression, a rationality of the 
world, a framework for practical activity. This function seems 
well phrased in an article in Civilta Cattolica ("Pagan Individ-
ualism and Christian Individualism," March 5, 1932): 
"Faith in a secure future, in the immortality of the soul 
destined to Paradise, the certainty of being able to reach eternal 
happiness, all this was the mainspring of a drive for internal 
perfection and spiritual development. True Christian individ-
ualism found here the impulse to its victories. All the strength 
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of a Christian was gathered around this noble end. Freed from 
speculative waverings which disarm the soul with doubts, and 
guided by immortal principles, man felt his hopes resurgent. 
Certain that in his struggle against evil a greater power sus-
tained him, man surpassed himself and won the world." 
Of course, this refers to primitive Christianity, not the jesu-
itized religion which has become a narcotic for the people. 
Even clearer and more significant for our argument is the po-
sition of Calvinism with its iron concept of predestination and 
grace which determined a vast expansion of individual initiative. 
We move on to another aspect of philosophy: how and why are 
new world views widely pr~pagated and popularized. This proc-
ess of propagation of the new is at the same time a substitution 
for, and often a combination with, the old. Various factors feed 
this process: the form in which the new world view is taught, the 
recognized authority of the teacher and of the thinkers who sup-
port him, the kind of people who belong to the organization 
which supports the new world view (even those who joined for 
other motives than the acceptance of the new world view). All 
these ~lements vary according to the social group and its cultural 
level. 
But the research in which we are most interested is the research 
on these factors within the broad population. The people change 
concepts with great difficulty, and never by accepting new con-
cepts in their "pure" form, so to speak, but always in some eclectic 
·combination. Rationality, logical coherence, completeness of 
argumentation, all these are important but far from decisive in 
dealing with the people. Of course, it can be decisive at a sec-
ondary level, if the person involved is already in a state of intel-
lectual crisis, has lost faith in the old, and is wavering between 
the old and the new. 
Ed .. Note: A pregnant analysis that seems tailor-made for 
American progressives who do have a tendency to assume that 
Urationality, logical coherence, completeness of argumenta-
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tion" are decisive in propaganda. Lincoln and Roosevelt 
knew better. So did a Lenin~ or~ in our own back yard, a 
Marcantonio. They knew, and consciously too~ that in deal-
ing with large groups of people the new ideas they 
presented would be absorbed unevenly~ in highly personal 
mixtures with other ideas and interpretations. They gave 
here and there~ seeking the largest areas of agreement~ and so 
were accused of opportunism and compromises. Yet they held 
to their course, successful political leaders. The Eisenhowers 
and the Nixons have no such problems, for they are not intro-
ducing new ideas. They manipulate the stereotypes of old, em-
bedded in the popular mind, and can thus find easily wide 
areas of agreement with the people. 
The same may be said of the authority of thinkers and scientists, 
which is generally very great among the people. But every world 
view can cite thinkers on its behalf, so that their authority is 
divided. Moreover, every thinker has a tendency to refine and 
qualify, to cast doubt on what he has said by his way of saying it. 
We may conclude therefore that the propagation of new con-
cepts takes place for political, ultimately social, reasons, and that 
logic, authority, and organization are very important only as soon 
as a general reorientation has· taken place in the individual or in 
the group. From this we conclude that in the people at this stage, 
philosophy can be lived only as a faith. 
After all, consider for a moment the intellectual position of the 
average person. He has been shaped by opinions, convictions, 
some criteria of discrimination, and certain rules of behavior. 
Any ideological opponent who is intellectually superior can argue 
his position better than our man can, defeat him logically, and so 
on. What should our man do, change his convictions because he 
can't win the given discussion? But then he might be changing his 
opinions once a day if he should happen to meet superior op-
ponents. This he cannot do, and he won't do. Therefore what is 
the basis of the philosophy of the average man, and especially 
of his ethics? Undoubtedly the most important element is not 
reason but faith. But faith in whom and in what? Faith in that 
social group to which he belongs and who think as vaguely as he 
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does; the average man feels that so many people cannot be as 
wrong as his argumentative opponent would like him to believe. 
It is true, thinks our man, he himself is not capable of winning the 
argument, but there is someone in his own group who can, and 
in fact our man remembers hearing such a coherent impressive 
argument for his beliefs that he was, and has remained, convinced. 
He may not remember the argument concretely, and he couldn't 
repeat it, but he knows it was true because he heard it and was 
convinced. The permanent reason for the permanence of a con-
viction is to have been strikingly convinced once. 
Ed. Note: This fine analysis of how new ideas spread out 
among the people is of great relevance to the American pro-
gressive movement. After a decade of reaction many progres-
sives are disheartened. The power of propaganda of the rul-
ing class seems so enormous (newpapers~ comic books~ radio, 
TV~ movies~ large sectors and elements of schools and col-
leges) that its sheer weight is sometimes paralyzing. But its 
power is deceptive. Years and years of falsification are swept 
aside at one stroke when a single experience teaches a person 
the truth, particularly (though not necessarily) if someone 
is at hand to focus the meaning of that experience for the per-
son concerned. 
The truth has to break through but once; the lies of the rul-
ing class have to be constantly reiterated. Again and again, 
a bitterly anti-union man becomes pro-union in a struggle~ 
and generally speaking this change is definitive; once a union 
man, always a union man. 
The ruling class in their propaganda are like the Red 
Queen: they must run and run to stay in the same place. Nay, 
they are constantly losing ground. Since the birth of Marx-
ism, over a hundred years ago, Marxism has steadily spread 
among the people from generation to generation, in every 
country and corner of the world including the West. It is a 
thought to keep in mind in bad times. 
We conclude that there is an extreme instability in the new 
convictions of the people, particularly if these convictions contra-
dict the orthodox convictions that conform to the interests of the 
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dominant class. We see this, thinking over the vicissitudes of re-
ligions and of churches. A given church maintains its community 
of faithful to the extent that it maintains its basic faith in an 
organized manner, indefatigably reiterating its apologetics, 
fighting at any and all times, using always the same arguments, 
and maintaining a hierarchy of intellectuals who dignify the faith 
with at least a semblance of thought. Every time the relations 
between the church and the faithful have been violently inter-
rupted for political reasons, as in the French Revolution, the 
losses to the church have been incalculable. If the difficulties in 
carrying out habitual rituals had continued, it is conce.ivable that 
the losses would have been decisive and that .a new religion would 
have arisen. In a sense this did happen in France with a mixture 
of new ideas and the ancient Catholicism. 
We deduce certain musts for any cultural movement which 
seeks to supplant old world views: 
1. To repeat unceasingly and tirelessly one's own arguments, 
though, of course, varying the literary form. Repetition is the 
most efficient didactic method of working on the popular mind. 
2. To work incessantly to raise the intellectual level of ever 
greater strata of the population. This entails developing groups 
of intellectuals of a new type, who rise directly from the people 
yet remain in contact with them, forming as it were the "ribs" 
corseting the mass. 
If this second condition is fulfilled, the uideological panorama" 
of an epoch is truly changed. The development of groups of 
individuals entails an organization within themselves, a hierarchy 
of intellectual competence and authority. This hierarchy may 
culminate in a great individual philosopher if he can relive con-
cretely the ideological needs of the people, if he understands that 
this ideology cannot have that elegance and subtlety appropriate 
to an individual brain, and must therefore develop formally a 
collective doctrine suitable to the ways of thinking of a co~lective 
man. 
It should be quite apparent that a basic conceptual change in 
the people cannot take place "arbitrarily" around any ideology 
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whatever as a consequence of the will of a strong personality or 
of a group who just wants to do it because of the fanaticism of its 
own convictions. The adherence or nonadherence of the people 
to an ideology is precisely the test which reveals the reality of a 
new concept, its rationality and its historical validity. "Arbitrary" 
systems may reach a degree of popularity because of favorable 
circumstances, but they are invariably eliminated in this histori-
cal competition. Concepts and systems which correspond to the 
complex necessities of an organic historical period always pre-
vail in the end, even though they may have to go through inter-
mediate phases during which their acceptance takes place in 
heterogeneous combinations and formulations. 
The unfolding of the movement whereby a new world view is 
accepted by the masses presents many problems. The funda-
mental one which we have mentioned is the relationship be-
tween the intellectuals and the people. More specifically, the prob-
lem lies in the function of the higher intellectual groups. On 
one hand their own intellectual development must be safe-
guarded; on the other hand they must bring creative support to 
the lower intellectual groups and the masses of people, bearing 
in mind their capacities for discussion and development of new 
concepts. It is a question basically of setting the limits of freedom 
of discussion and propaganda, a freedom which must be under-
stood not in the context of police methods, but in the context of 
self-discipline and self-control which the leadership places upon 
itself. 
Ed. Note: Here we come to the great problem which is agi-
tating all the socialist countries of the world~ a problem which 
life itself poses and not this or that bureaucracy, as many 
people think. The character of a bureaucracy is primarily the 
result and not the cause of the way this problem is resolved, 
though, of course, one affects the other. 
Weare speaking, in effect, of laying down the "line" in culture 
and politics. Let us look at the problem this way: who will deter-
mine the "rights of science" and the limits of scientific research? 
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In fact, can these rights and these limits be determined at all? I 
think not. It seems to me that of necessity the search for new 
truths, and for clearer, more coherent formulations of these truths 
must be left to the free initiative of the individual scientists-even 
if scientists continually re-examine those very premises which seem 
most essential, fundamental, and settled once and for all. 
Ed. Note: Gramsci, the Marxist philosopher in the great 
Marxist tradition, unequivocally asserts the necessity-neces-
sity, not desirability-of free scientific inquiry. The scientist 
himself must be the judge of his own freedom. When 
Gramsci speaks of science he includes Marxism. His last 
sentence serves both to rivet his philosophic position and to 
hint that this creates problems for the statesman. Since 
Gramsci was an active political leader, he is fully aware of 
these p·roblems. Therefore, having spoken as a philosopher, 
he continues the analysis as a political leader. 
Of course, it is not too difficult to c~ari£y and expose those 
"scientific initiatives" which have ulterior motives and are not 
the result of disinterested scientific inquiry. In addition, while the 
thought is free, it is not impossible to consider that the results do 
not have to be publicized. Individual initiatives may be disciplined 
by passing through the sieve of academies, cultural institutes of 
various kinds, and so on. Only after such examination can they be-
come public. 
Ed. Note: This is not a jesuitical argument, taking back 
with the left hand what he gave with the right. Gramsci is 
wrestling with .a p'roblem which is insoluble in principle at · 
our level of civilization, the conflict between innovation and 
stability; the conflict between the needs of the individual 
and the needs of the group; the conflict between the rfJ,inority 
and the majority in a society. The role of the political leader 
and of political science is to reconcile, make things viable. 
Politics is the art of the possible. Note the word art}' not sci-
ence; the individual plays an important role. This is what 
Gramsci is doing. 
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We would offer the so-called American Dilemma as an ex-
ample, the p'roblem of race prejudice in the South. It is in-
soluble under conditions of capitalism. It can be ameliorated 
by a combination of laws, force, education, the pressure of 
social approval and disapproval of the rest of the country. 
Negroes will go to school, Negroes will get the vote, but racial 
prejudice will not disappear. It will take a considerable period 
of socialism until racism will completely disappear, that is, be 
completely eliminated from the consciousness of human 
beings just as totemism has disappeared from the conscious-
ness of modern man. In our stage of society in the United 
States the best a functioning political leader can do is to re-
move the legal disabilities against Negroes and stop the use 
of force and violence against Negroes in the South. 
As an aid to studying the relationships between philosophy and 
the people, it would be of great interest to examine concretely, for 
a single country, the cultural organization which keeps the ideo-
logical world in motion. It would be useful to examine its practi-
cal day-to-day operations. It would be useful also to study the 
numerical relations between the professional personnel engaged 
in cultural work and the population of a given country, together 
with an estimate of the nonprofessional people so engaged. 
Schools at all levels and churches are the two major cultural 
organizations in any country in view of the number of people 
working in them. Newspapers, magazines, libraries are next as 
well as private scholastic institutions. Certain professions include 
in their specialized activities a substantial amount of cultural 
work, for example, doctors, army officers, judges. 
It must be noted, however, that in all countries, to a varying 
degree, there is a gap between the masses of people and the intel-
lectual groups, even those closer to the people in great numbers, 
like priests and teachers. This is so because, no matter what the 
rulers say, the state does not have a coherent unifying role, so 
that various intellectual groups are disjointed from level to level 
of the population. The universities, for example, except in a very 
few countries, play no unifying role, so that often a single inde-
pendent thinker has more influence than the entire institution 
of universities. 
Finally, a few words on the historical role of fatalism within 
Marxism. We should, I think, prepare a funeral elegy on the con-
cept of fatalism, praising its usefulness in a certain historical 
period but burying it once for all-with full honors. Fatalism 
can be compared to the theories of grace and predestination at the 
beginnings of the modern world which finally culminated with 
the classical German philosophy and its concept of freedom as the 
recognition of necessity. The concept of fatalism was a popular 
substitute for the medieval cry "God will it," although even at 
this primitive level of causality it was a more modern and fruitful 
concept. It is possible that a new concept might be born in a dif-
ferent "formal" manner than the rough and uncouth form which 
the people shape. Nevertheless the historian with his perspectives 
can point out that the beginnings of a new world, always stony 
and bitter, are superior to the decline of a dying world and its 
swan songs. 
Base and Superstructure 
Economics and ideology. We must fight theoretically as primi-
tive infantilism the attempt to explain every fluctuation of politics 
and ideology as an immediate reflection of some change in the 
economic base of the structure. This nonsense is sometimes even 
presented as an axiom of historical materialism. In practice we 
can fight this idea with the authentic testimony of Marx, whose 
political and historical works are always concrete. See particularly 
the Eighteenth Brumaire, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in 
Germany., Civil War in France., etc. An analysis of these writings 
will help to see clearly Marxist historical methodology, by inte-
grating, interpreting, and illumin~ting the various theoretical 
propositions scattered throughout all these volumes. 
One can see how many warnings Marx introduces in his con-
crete researches, warnings which would have no place in his 
theoretical, generalized writings. An;lOng these warnings we may 
list the following: 
1. The difficulty in identifying at any given time the economic 
base of a society as if it were static. Politics is, of course, at any 
moment the reflection of unfolding tendencies in the economic 
base, tendencies, however, which may not come to fruition; nor 
can they be analyzed in process. The point is that any phase in the 
development of the economic base can be studied concretely only 
after its development has been finished. During the process of 
development the phase can be studied only through hypothesis, 
by suppositions, and we must be clear that's what we are doing. 
[Italics added-Ed.] 
2. It follows from this that any specific political act may have 
been an error on the part of the administrators of the ruling 
classes, an error which historical development rectifies through 
the parliamentary "crisis" in the governments of the ruling classes. 
Mechanistic historical materialism does not consider the possibil-
ity of error, but assumes that every political act is determined by 
the economic base of society, that it is a reflection of some real 
change in the base. The concept of "error" is a complex one: it 
may be an individual error or it may be an indication of attempts 
at control by factions within the ruling class, attempts which may 
or may not fail. 
3. We don't pay enough attention to the fact that many politi-
cal actions are due to internal organizational necessities, the needs 
to maintain the coherence of a party, a group, a society. The his-
tory of the Catholic Church is full of examples. If every ideologi-
cal struggle within the Church had to be explained by a change 
in the base of society, a student would go crazy. (I must say many 
political-economic "dime novels" have been written this way.) 
Most of the ideological arguments were related to organizational 
needs. For example, take the struggle between Rome and 
Byzantium on the derivation of the Holy Ghost. It would be 
ridiculous to seek in the economic base of Eastern Europe the 
reason for the assertion that the Holy Ghost derives only from the 
Father, and likewise in Western Europe for the assertion that the 
Holy Ghost derives from the Father and the Son. The existence 
and conflicts of the two Churches do depend on their economic 
base and on their historical developments, but the specifk posi-
tions on the Holy Ghost were set forth as an area of differentiation 
by the two Churches to strengthen their internal cohesion. They 
could have changed positions and it wouldn't have mattered so 
long as the conflict was maintained. This is the real historical 
problem to be analyzed and not the casuistry on each side. 
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What Is Man 
What is man? This is the first and principal question in philoso-
phy. If we think about it we see that when we ask what man is, 
we are really asking what man can become) that is, can man dom-
inate his own destiny, can he "remake himself," can he create his 
own life? We answer, therefore, that man is a process, the process 
of his activities. 
The very question, what is man, is not an abstract question. 
It arises from our introspection, our thinking about ourselves and 
about others. We want to know what we are to know what we can 
be; we want to know within what limits, if any, we can "forge our-
selves." And we want to know this "today," that is, in the condi-
tions of contemporary life. 
The content of this question is already shaped by given ways 
of considering life and mankind. The most important of these 
existing ways is religion, and particularly one religion, Catholi-
cism. In reality when we ask, what is man, how important is his 
will, etc., we are asking: "Is Catholicism a correct view of life and 
man? Are we in error or are we right in being Catholics, in making 
this religion our way of life?" Now everyone has a vague intuition 
that he is making a mistake in adhering to Catholicism as a way 
of life and, in fact, no one does it, although he still calls himself 
Catholic. A real integrated Catholic, one who would apply 
Catholic rules to every act of his life, would be a monster. When 
one thinks about it, this is the most severe criticism that could 
be made of Catholicism, and the most inescapable. 
Ed. Note: These last two sentences have been given life in 
the novel The Ecstasy of Owen Muir by Ring Lardner Jr. 
Owen Muir is a convert to Catholicism who seeks to apply 
the rules of his religion to every act of his life. The resulting 
contradictions not only give great scope to Mr. Lardner's 
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superlative satire, but they show inexorably that rigorous 
adherance to Catholic dogma does turn a man into a U mon-
ster." 
Since Italy is a Catholic country, Gramsci's knowledge and 
awareness of Catholicism are part of his life both theoretically 
and as a political leader. But much of what he has to say is 
applicable to the United States. This country is the major 
financial and political stronghold of the Catholic Interna-
tional, and the Vatican is a much underestimated factor in 
world politics. Domestically, too, the American Catholic 
hierarchy, in its philosophy, organizational outlook, educa-
tional powers, and consciousness in daily activities, is one of 
the most important components of reaction at every level, 
municipal, state, and federal. American Marxists have shied 
away from the problem of Catholicism both in theoretical 
and in practical activities, primarily because of the fallacious 
view that it would be divisive to pay too much attention to it. 
The Ecstasy of Owen Muir was criticized for this reason. 
Admittedly the problem is difficult, but it is not insoluble. 
It calls for political skill and knowledge; concrete examina-
tion and concrete solutions. But one thing is certain: nothing 
is ever gained by leaving the field to the enemy. 
In rebutta1, Catholics will argue that no other world view is 
faithfully followed in action. This argument is true, but all it 
shows is that historically there is no other way of thinking which 
applies equally to all men. That is all this argument proves and 
there is nothing in it favorable to Catholicism. The contrary is 
the case when one considers that this way of life has been organ-
ized for centuries with the aim of having men conform to its 
dogma and that no other religion has operated with the continu-
ity, the means, the centralization, the power, and the systematic 
exposition of its dogma as the Catholic Church. 
What makes for dissatisfaction in Catholicism from a "philo-
sophical" point of view is that it places evil within man as an in-
dividual. [Adam arid original sin-Ed.] Man, therefore, is 
a well defined, and limited, individual. All religions hitherto exist-
ing, in one way or another, have basically the same position as 
Catholicism. All conceive man as an individual prisoner of him-
self, limited by his own individuality, his mind and soul so 
limited. It is this concept of man which must be changed. [Italics 
added-Ed.] We must conceive of individual man as a series of 
active relationships, a process, in which his individuality is not 
the only element to be considered, though it is of the greatest 
importance. 
Humanity, mankind, as reflected in each individual is com-
posed of three elements: (1) the individual, (2) other individuals, 
(3) nature. Elements two and three are not as simple as they seem. 
The individual's relations with other men are not merely based 
on juxtaposition, just being next to one another. These relations 
are organic, they take place only to the extent that the individual 
is part of social organisms, from the simplest to the most complex. 
Likewise man does not enter into relationships with nature by the 
mere fact that he is himself a part of nature. He deals with nature 
actively and organically, through his labor and his technics. But 
there is more. These relationships are not mechanical. They are 
active, conscious, and self-conscious to the degree that the indi-
vidual man is aware of them. 
It may be said therefore that each person changes himself to the 
extent that he changes and modifies the entire complex of rela-
tionships which center in him. FrQm this aspect the real philoso-
pher is the political person, the active man who modifies his 
environment, the sum total of his relations. If one's own indi-
viduality is the totality of his relationships, the consciousness of 
self, the personality, is the awareness of the totality. To change 
one's own personality means to change this totality. 
Ed. Note: This most penetrating analysis of personality 
illuminates the proposition that the Marxist "know thyself" 
is a social~ active concept rather than a static, contemplative 
phenomenon of individual introspection. As mentioned else-
where in these notes, the analysis is extremely relevant to the 
problem of self-criticism and concretely, in the United States 
as elsewhere, to the problem of raising the caliber of Marxist 
thought. 
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These relationships, as we have said, are not simple. Some are 
necessary, others voluntary. Furthermore, to be conscious of them 
is already to change them in some degree. Necessary relationships 
change in importance, appearance, and significance to the extent 
that their necessity is recognized. In this sense, knowledge is 
power. But the problem is furth~r complicated. It isn't enough 
to understand the totality of relationships at a given moment, as 
a given system, but we must understand it genetically, understand 
how the system and the relationships were formed. Every indi-
vidual is not only the synthesis of contemporary relationships, he 
is also a summary of the entire past. It may be objected that 
what each individual can change is very little. This is true up to a 
point. But since each person can join others who want the same 
changes he can multiply himself an imposing number of times. If 
the change desired is "rational/' historically possible, then even a 
very radical change can be achieved, one that did not seem possible 
at first sight. 
The social groups which an individual can join are extremely 
numerous, much more so than one would think. Through these 
groups and groupings an individual becomes part of the human 
species. Likewise numerous are the ways in which an individual 
deals with nature, because by technics we must understand not 
only scientific ideas applied industrially, but also such "mental" 
instruments as philosophic knowledge. 
Man cannot be conceived of except as living in a society. This 
is a commonplace, but all the consequences have not been stud-
ied .... We must develop a doctrine wherein all the relationships 
are active and in motion, keeping clearly in mind that the control 
center of this activity is the individual self-consciousness of the 
individual human being who knows, desires, admires, creates 
only to the extent that he knows, desires, admires, creates, etc. 
Provided that th~ individual is always conceived not as isolated, 
but one full of the possibilities offered to him by other men and 
by nature. 
Marxism and Modern Culture 
Marxism has been a nodal point in the development of modern 
culture. In varying degrees it has determined or influenced many 
philosophic currents, but this significant fact has been generally 
ignored by "orthodox" students of Marxism. Probably the reason 
for this neglect is that the most significant philosophic amalgams 
have been those between Marxism and idealism, amalgams which 
struck orthodox students as reactionary or downright fraudulent. 
Hitherto, Marxism has been subjected to a double revisionism. 
On one hand some of its elements were incorporated, implicitly or 
explicitly, into certain idealist positions-Croce, Gentile, Sorel, 
Bergson and pragmatism. One current even went back to Kant, as 
for example the work of Professor Adler of Vienna and in Italy 
Professors Poggi and Baratono. 
On the other hand, the "orthodox" students, narrowly under-
standing Marxism as a "simple" interpretation of history, tried 
tq strengthen it by identifying it with a philosophy which was 
basically a traditional materialism. In general, blends of Marxism 
with idealism have been attempted by what we may term "pure" 
intellectuals, whereas the "orthodox" view was developed by more 
active intellectuals whose activities put them in touch, to some 
degree, with sections of the people. This contact, it should be 
added, did not prevent many of these intellectuals from making 
somersaults of considerable political, and historical, importance. 
The distinction between "pure" and "active" intellectuals has 
considerable significance. The first tended to be leaders in their 
respective countries, architects of the ideologies of the ruling 
classes. They used elements of Marxism to strengthen their ideolo-
gies, particularly to tone down the speculative elements in their 
philosophies. Their purpose was to forge new and better weapons 
for their own social class. 
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The "active" intellectuals, on the other hand, were in many 
cases fighting for progress and trying to combat the most reaction-
ary ideology among the people, namely, transcendental religion. 
They tried to utilize in their struggle an opposing ideology al-
ready widespread among the people, namely, crude materialism. 
Such materialism is a large component of common sense, as well 
as of superstition and witchcraft which are fostered by religion 
among the ignorant. As a result, the tendency of orthodox Marx-
ism was to fall into the trap of a vulgar materialism. 
Ed. Note: The most important of these ruling class philoso-
phers who have used Marxist concepts to develop better 
ideological weapons has undoubtedly been Bergson with his 
pragmatism, which in America was spread by Professors 
Royce and James. Gramsci, as he mentions above and re-
iterates below, considers pragmatism the philosophy most 
in debt to Marxism. We are in no position to evaluate this 
judgment of Gramsci; we would venture that pragmatism's 
emphasis on action as a test of truth seems to owe a good 
deal to the Marxist emphasis on practice (the unity of theory 
and practice). However, as Gramsci says, this subject requires 
much study. 
What is incontestable, however, is the importance of such 
study, for p'ragmatism has been and is the major ideological 
weapon of the American ruling classes and its penetration in 
Marxist ranks has been the greater because the less realized. 
Against all these approaches, Antonio Labriola affirms (though 
not always consistently) the proposition that Marxism is an in-
dependent and original philosophy, self-contained, autonomous, 
and capable of further development. Entirely from its own inner 
resources, Marxism can develop further not only in the interpreta-
tion of history but as a world philosophy of the widest applica-
tion.· We must follow Labriola's path. 
• "Labriola, Antonio, 1843-1904. Italian socialist ph osopher. Professor 
at the University of Rome from 1874 until his death. Was under the influence 
of Hegel, Hebart, and Marx respectively .... As the first professor of 
philosophy in a European university to expound historical materialism, 
Labriola raised the prestige of revolutionary socialism in intellectual circles."-
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. 
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Ed. Note: This proposition of Antonio Labriola is funda-
mental to Gramsci's thought. Gramsci argues that since Marx 
and Engels there has been a deterioration in the study and 
application of Marxism primarily because Marxists have not 
'fully realized the strength of Marxism as a completely autono-
mous philosophy. Marxism will develop not by marrying 
Marx to Freud; to Jesus} to logical positivism} or to what have 
you} but by se-rious; sobetr study of reality in the light of dia-
lectical materialism. The need} to put it crudely} is to take 
Marxism seriously} rather than dogmatically. Dogmatism is 
the opposite of taking Marxism seriously. It uses Marxism not 
as a theory and a tool to examine reality} but rather as a source 
of authoritarian quotations -to support opportunistic ideas. 
It is illuminating to find out why Marxism ~as been used by 
both idealists and materialists. How could such contrasting phi-
losophies find elements in Marxism which were of value to them? 
Research on this question requires analytical finesse and intellec-
tual sobriety. Studies must be made with great critical caution to 
identify those concepts which Marxism has Hgiven" to traditional 
philosophies, thereby rejuvenating them for a time. Such studies, 
in a sense, would amount to a history of modern culture since 
Marx and Engels. 
It is not difficult to trace explicit borrowings of Marxist con-
cepts. A classic example is Croce's reduction of Marxism to a set 
of empirical rules for historical research. Croce's concept has 
penetrated even into Catholic circles (see the work of Monsignor 
Olgiati) and has helped to create that Italian school of history 
known as the economic-juridical school. 
More difficult, however, is the research on the unavowed, im-
plioit borrowings from Marxism, due to the fact that this philos-
ophy, because it was a nodal point in modern culture, has become 
part of a general climate of opinion and has modified modes of 
old thought in subtle and hidden ways. In Sorel and his develop-
ment, for example, . one can find many clues to hidden Marxist 
concepts. The same is true of Croce. The most important example, 
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however, is that of Bergson and pragmatism. A careful study 
would show, we believe, that many of the concepts of pragmatism 
would be inconceivable without the historical link of Marxism. 
Another facet of this question of Marxist influence is seen in 
political science. Just as the Jesuits fight Machiavelli theoretically 
and at the same time are his best disciples, so opponents of Marx-
ism reject it bitterly in words while in practice they accept Marx's 
political analysis. For example, when Mario MissiroIi was Rome 
correspondent of the Stampa he wrote in a column (around 1925) 
that the more intelligent industrialists believed in their heart of 
hearts that Das Kapital had some deep insights into their world 
and were using these insights for their own purposes. This, of 
course, is not surprising. If Marx has in fact analyzed capitalism 
correctly this simply means that he has systematized coherently 
what the historical agents of capitalism feel vaguely and intui-
tively. After Marxism, these agents become more clearly aware of 
their role, more self-conscious. 
Ed. Note: What was surmised thirty years ago is unques-
tionably true today. Secretary of Defense Forrestal~ of un-
happy fame, hired a professor to make him a study of 
Marxism. The European ruling classes have for years studied 
Marxism in their great universities, often under well-known 
Marxists as teachers. In part this is due to the fact that as the 
U.S.S.R. grew in power ruling groups wished to understand 
their enemy, yet in part it is also the result of the value of 
Marxism as a philosophy and its pressure on all areas Of 
knowledge. 
This phenomenon should give pause to many American 
progressives who are ready to jettison Marxism because it is 
((out of date/' particularly those who do so under a rational-
ization of ascertaining "what is still valid today." While there 
is no question whatever that Marxism must always be con-
cretely applied to any historical period or situation, and in 
that sense its lIvalidity" is constantly tested~ the premise of this 
activity is the knowledge of Marxist thought. Serious~ sus-
tained MarXiist study in a context of high critical standards, 
by people who are committed and are active in the world 
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around them, is a minimum prerequisite for a revitalized 
Marxist movement in America. 
Let us return to our earlier and more interesting discussion: 
why did orthodox students combine Marxism with traditional 
materialism rather than with other philosophies equally current? 
Relevant to this question is the essay of Rosa Luxemburg, Still-
stand und Fortschritt im Marxismus (Vorwarts, March 14, 1903), 
which notes that various elements of Marxism have been devel-
oped in varying degrees but always according to the requirements 
of practical work. She argues that Marx and Engels had been so 
in advance of their generation, and the following one, that their 
ideological weapons could not be used because few were able to 
use them. With the passing of time, these weapons are now useful 
and should be refurbished. To some extent this explanation is 
logically circular, nevertheless it has an element of truth which 
should be developed. As we have previously mentioned, Marxism 
allied itself with other philosophic tendencies in order to fight 
the remnants of pre-capitalist ideologies within the masses of the 
people, religion in particular. 
Marxism had two tasks: on one hand to combat modern ideol-
ogies in their subtlest forms in order to. build its own group of 
intellectuals, and on the other hand to educate the masses of 
people whose culture was practically medieval. Given the charac-
ter of Marxism, this second task seemed fundamental. As a result 
it absorbed all the energies of Marxism, quantitatively and quali-
tatively. For propaganda purposes Marxism was combined with 
a form of culture somewhat superior to the popular average (which, 
of course, was extremely low) and by so doing became absolutely 
inadequate to combat the ideologies of the cultured classes. All 
this despite the fact that Marxism was born to supersede classic 
German philosophy, the highest cultural manifestation of the 
period. 
Ed. Note: Rosa Luxemburg'S idea is a thought-provoking 
one and so is Gramsci's, but it should be remembered that 
Gramsci is speaking from a background Of Catholicism. In 
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the United States, while religion is a powerful ideological 
weapon of reaction, it is not nearly so powerful as in Catholic 
countries, and there is less cause for Marxism to be vulgarized. 
We should study whether the kind of cultural "deployment" 
we have outlined is not a historical necessity and whether in past 
history we couldn't find similarities in other cultural develop-
ments. To me the claSSIC example in recent times has been the 
Renaissance in Italy and the Reformation in Protestant countries. 
Croce has something to contribute on this. On page 11, History 
of the Baroque in Italy, he writes: 
"The movement of the Renaissance remained aristocratic, 
within elite circles. Even in Italy, which was its mother and 
nurse, the Renaissance never left the Court circles, never pene-
trated to the people, never became 'custom and prejudice,' a 
collective belief and faith. The Reformation, on the other 
hand, 'did have the efficacy of popularization but paid for it 
with a slowing up of its inner development,' that is, with the 
interrupted maturing of its vital germ." 
On page 8 Croce writes, 
"Luther, like the humanists, deplores sadness and praises 
happiness, condemns idleness and commends labor, yet at the 
same time shows such a hostility to literature and studies that 
Erasmus could say ubicumque regnat lutheranismus ibi littera-
rum est interitus [and wherever Lutheranism rules, there litera-
ture is buried]. Whether or not" continues Croce, "this aversion 
of Luther's was solely responsible, the fact is that German Prot-
estantism for some two centuries was sterile of studies, cri-
tiques, or philosophies." 
Ed. Note: Here in passing is an idea which has great value 
today, as large sections of the world's population are in tran-
sition from an old form of society to a new form. It takes a 
long period, sometimes measured in centuries, for new ways 
of thought to be assimilated by the people, and for new 
groups of intellectuals and artists to be formed so completely 
imbued with the new world view that art comes to fruition 
in presenting that world view. 
The upholders of the old can sneer, always and easily, at 
the lack of culture in the new society and point with pride to 
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the existing culture~ still being produced by the old. This~ of 
course~ is what has gone on for years in regard to Soviet litera-
ture~ painting~ architecture~ and~ to a lesser extent~ Soviet 
music. But the socialist world won't take two centuries to 
come into fruition. Already~ in science? the first breakthroughs 
are taking place~ and large intellectual groups have been 
shaped. 
Erasmus~ who sneers at Lutheranism~ was a liberal Catho-
lic~ and as much against the abuses of the Church as Martin 
Luther. He was a man of great stature in the Catholic world 
of his day~ yet he and others like him ucrooked the pregnant 
hinges of their knees" before the threat of excommunication 
and the fear of being burned at the stake. Valiant in their 
sneers~ they were pliant in their actions. 
Calvinism also, with its harsh conception of grace, did not favor 
free research. What happened to Calvinism, however, is that in 
the process of interpreting and adapting the concept of grace to 
that of a vocation (a calling) it ended up by forcefully promoting 
economic production and the accumulation of wealth. 
The Lutheran Reformation and Calvinism gave rise to vast 
national-popular movements, in which the ideologies became 
widely diffused, and a superior culture was created only in much 
later periods. This immediate popular diffusion within the Prot-
estant countries enabled them to withstand tenaciously and vic-
toriously the crusade of Catholic armies. Thus was born the 
Gennan nation, one of the more vigorous countries in modern 
Europe. 
France was lacerated by religious wars which ended with a 
seeming victory for Catholicism. But in the 1700'S there began to 
take place a great popular reform, with the Enlightenment, the 
spread of the spirit of Voltaire and the Encyclopedists, a reform 
which preceded and accompanied the Revolution of 1789. This 
huge intellectual and moral reform of the French people was even 
more complete than that of Luther in Germany because it in-
volved the great peasant masses, because it had a pronounced lay 
basis, and because it tried to substitute for religion the completely 
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nonreligious ideologies of nationalism and patriotism. N everthe-
less, not even this reform resulted in an immediate flowering of 
high culture except in political science with the development of 
law. 
Marxism can be conceived of as a modern popular reforma-
tion. . . . It presupposes our entire cultural past, Renaissance 
and Reformation, German philosophy and French revolution, 
Calvinism and English economy, lay liberalism and that sense 
of history which is the root of all modem conceptions of life. 
Marxism is the crowning achievement of this entire movement 
of intellectual and moral reform, dialectically realized in the 
contradiction between popular culture and high culture. Marx-
ism corresponds to the nexus of the Protestant Reformation and 
the French Revolution: it is a philosophy which is also a politics, 
and a politics which is also a philosophy. 
Marxism is still going ,through its popular phase. To develop 
a group of independent intellectuals is not easy. It is a long proc-
ess of actions and reactions, adhesions, desertions, dissolutions, 
new and many groupings and regroupings of a complex character. 
Marxism is the world view of an oppressed social class which has 
had no historical initiative. This class has grown continually 
larger without ever being able to pass a certain qualitative point: 
the lack of state power. The full organic development of an 
intellectual group can take place only through the real exercise 
of authority in a society. Yes, Marxism has itself become "prej-
udice" and "superstition," a popularized aspect of modern his-
tory, but Marxism has within itself the potential to surpass this 
popularization. 
One final point at this time. In studying the history of cultural 
developments we must pay special attention to how cultures are 
organized and to the personnel of those cultures. In a volume of 
G. di Ruggiero, Renaissance and ReformationJ we can see what 
was the attitude of most intellectuals of that time, headed by 
Erasmas. They bent before the persecutions and the burnings. 
It was the German people who carried on the Reformation. The 
desertion of the intellectuals before the enemy helps to explain 
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the sterility of the Reformation in the realm of advanced culture. 
Time was needed while a new group of intellectuals slowly 
emerged from the people, to carryon the work that culminated 
in classical German philosophy. 
Something similar has happened so far to Marxism. The great 
intellectuals who became Marxists were not only very few but 
they were not tied to the people, they weren't of the people. Gen-
erally they were the products of intermediate classes to which 
they returned at times of great historical upheavals. Others who 
remained carried on a systematic revision of Marxism instead of 
furthering its autonomous development. We assert that Marxism, 
although a nodal point in world history, is nevertheless a new con-
cept, original and independent. We thereby also assert the inde-
pendence of a new culture now incubating which will develop 
with the development of social relations. 
What exists from time to time is a varying combination of the 
old and the new, a momentary equilibrium of cultural relations 
corresponding to the equilibrium of social relations. Only after 
the creation of a new state does the cultural problem impinge on 
society in its entire complexity. Before the formation of a state 
Marxism has to be critical-polemical, and, while it should never 
be dogmatic, it cannot help a somewhat romantic stance. But it 
is a romanticism which consciously aspires to a serene classicism. 
Marxism not only claims to explain and justify the past, it 
claims to explain and justify itself. It claims the greatest degree 
of historical perspective, utter freedom from any abstract ideology, 




Scientific Discussion. We must not conceive of a scientific dis-
cussion as if it were a courtroom proceeding in which there are a 
defendant and a prosecutor who, by duty of his office, must show 
the defendant guilty. It is a premise of scientific discussion that the 
interest lies in the search for truth and the advancement of 
science. Therefore the most "advanced" thinker is he who under-
stands that his adversary may express a truth which should be 
incorporated in his own ideas, even if in a minor way. To under-
stand and evaluate realistically the position and reasons of one's 
adversary (and sometimes the adversary is the entire thought of 
the past) means to have freed oneself from the prison of ideologies, 
in the sense of blind fanaticism. One has then arrived at a critical 
frame of mind, the only fruitful stance in scientific research. 
(Italics added.-Ed.) 
Marxism and English classical economy. In a certain sense, one 
may say that Marxism is Hegel plus Ricardo. Let us pose the 
problem: are the new methodological concepts introduced by 
Ricardo in the science of economics to be considered merely 
as tools, or do they have significance as philosophical innova-
tions? Is the formal logical principle of the "law of tendency" 
which enables one to define scientifically the fundamental con-
cepts of economics and of the "determined market" a discovery 
with epistemological value? Does not this law imply a new concept 
of "necessity," of freedom, etc.? It seems to me that Marxism has 
universalized the discoveries of Ricardo, which are tied to the 
birth of the science of economics. This is the point in the develop-
ment of the bourgeoisie when it has become "concretely" a world 
class, that is, that a world market is formed sufficiently "dense," 
full of complex movements sufficiently numerous so that within 
them one may isolate laws of regularities, laws of tendencies. Natu-
rally, these are not laws in a deterministic sense, but "historical" 
laws through which is observed the "determined market," an or-
ganically living environment. 
Translation of Philosophic 
and Scientific Idioms 
In 1921, while dealing with organizational questions, Lenin 
wrote or (said) something like this: We have not learned to "trans-
late" our language into the various European languages. 
Ed. Note: The use of the word language is misleading, for 
Lenin is not thinking primarily of the Russian tongue but 
of Soviet ways of thinking, even Soviet ways of acting, both 
deeply affected by the culture, history, and mores of past and 
existing Russia. Today it is accepted that Soviet develop'ment 
has been affected, for good and evil, by the Russian past. 
To avoid misunderstandingJ we are using the word 
"idiom" to indicate the cultural ensemble, the ways of think-
ing and acting in a country at a given time. By corollary the 
word "translate" me{lns to transpose, to find correspondence 
or differentiations among the "idioms" of various countries, 
or of different periods in the same country. For example, can 
the French political revolution be compared with the Ger-
man philosophical revolution? 
There is a question whether the reciprocal translation of dif-
ferent scientific and philosophic idioms is a key element of all 
world views including Marxism, or whether Marxism alone can 
achieve such translation, while other world views can do so 
partially or not at all. 
Translation of idioms into one another presupposes that a 
given period of civilization has "basically" an identical cultural 
expression, even if the idioms of the nations in that civilization 
are quite different, since they are each determined by a specific 
national development, culture, philosophic systems, etc. There is 
also a question whether a translation of idioms is possible between 
different phases of a civilization which have developed one from 
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the other and are thus, in a way, integrated. Finally, can any 
existing idiom be translated in the idiom of a past phase of a 
given civilization? This is particularly useful if the past phase is 
more comprehensible than the present one and can thus serve to 
illuminate it. 
I believe that only in Marxism is such "translation" possible 
in an organic manner, whereas in other world views this trans-
lation is often only a schematic game. 
Ed. Note: Many historians have used the past to illuminate 
the presentJ and vice versa. Many have found J or imposedJ cor-
respondences between various periods of greater or lesser 
validity. The most ambitious attempt in our times has been 
that of Arnold Toynbee J who has created a series of conceptsJ 
((withdrawal and return/' Uinternal pro Ie taria t/' Utime of 
troubles/' etc., to ((translate" various periods in various civil-
izations. Toynbee's world view is a mysticalJ transcendental 
Christianity essentially reactionary. Because of his enormous 
erudition (perhaps unique in contemporary historiography), 
his liberal position in English P'olitics, the urbane tone of his 
writing as well as a reticence in expressing too often, and 
too explicitly, his philosophy, Toynbee's reactionary char-
acter has not been sufficiently noticed. Life magazine, how-
ever, devoted an enormous amount of space to popularize as 
much as possible the name of Mr. Toynbee and his concepts. 
See the review on Toynbee by Paul Sweezy in The Nation, 
Oct. I9, I946, reprinted in The Present as History, Monthly 
Review Press, I953. 
There is a passage in The Holy Family which says the French 
political idiom of Proudhon corresponds to and may be trans-
lated into the idiom of German classical philosophy. The idea 
is very important in understanding certain aspects of Marxism, 
in finding a solution to seeming contradictions in history and in 
answering certain superficial objections against historical ma-
terialism .... 
Let us see first if this critical principle has been approximated, 
or confused, by others with analogous formulations. In the Sep-
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tember-October, 1930, issue of New Studies in Law, Economics 
and Politics Luigi Einaudi writes an open letter to Rodolfo Benini 
[two eminent economists of the period] and a note on page 303 
says: 
"I wish I had the faculty of my dear departed friend Vailanti 
who could translate any theory from a geometric language to 
an algebraic language, hedonism into Kantian ethics, pure 
economics into applied economics. I would then translate a 
page of Mr. Spirito into your formal language, classic eco-
nomics. It would be a fruitful exercise similar to that described 
by Loria who in his youth took an economic problem and pre-
sented it first in the language of Adam Smith, then Ricardo, then 
Marx, Stuart Mill, and Cairnes. But such exercises can only 
find their way into a drawer, as did Loria's. They are useful 
only to teach us humility whenever we think we have found 
something truly new. Because if this novelty can be presented 
in the language of our ancients, and be framed in their thought, 
then it can't be so completely new. However, each generation 
can and should use the language which better suits it to under-
stand the world. History is constantly rewritten, why shouldn't 
economics be rewr,itten, first in terms of cost of production, then 
utility, then static equilibriums, then dynamic equilibriums?" 
This methodological note of Einaudi is very limited and re-
fers to the idioms of scientific personalities rather than to idioms 
of national cultures .... However, it does seem like a first small 
approximation to the more profound and larger problem posed 
in The Holy Family. 
Often two scientists, both shaped fundamentally by the same 
civilization, believe that they are developing different "truths" 
because they are using different scientific languages. Similarly 
two national cultures, shaped by the same civilization, consider 
themselves different, opposite, an.tagonistic, each superior to the 
other only because they used different idioms shaped by differing 
tradition and activities peculiar to each culture: a political-jurid-
ical idiom in France while in Germany the idiom is philosophic, 
theoretic, and doctrinaire. 
For the historian these two cultures can be reciprocally trans-
lated. This "translation" may n6t be exact, of course, even in 
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important particulars. (But what tongue is perfectly translatable? 
What single word can be exactly rendered in another tongue?) 
The important point, however, is that they are basically similar . 
. . . The observation in The Holy Family that the French political 
idiom is equivalent to the idiom of classic German philosophy 
was expressed "poetically" by the Italian poet Carducci: 
"A King lost his head to Robespierre, 
Kant send God reeling through the air." 
In creating this poetic junction between the practical politics 
of Maximilian Robespierre and the speculative thinking of 
Emmanuel Kant, Carducci borrowed this idea from Heine. But 
the juxtaposition of Robespierre and Kant is not original with 
Heine. Croce writes that he found a fugitive mention of it in a 
letter from Hegel to Schelling (July 21, 1795), and it was then de-
veloped in Hegel's lessons on the history of philosophy and the 
philosophy of history. In Lessons on the History of Phil-
osophy Hegel says that "the philosophy of Kant, Fichte, and 
Schelling contains, in the form of thought, a revolution" which 
has gone forward in Germany and in which "only two peoples have 
participated, the German and the French, however opposite they 
are one to the other, in fact just because they are opposite." How-
ever, whereas the new principle "erupted in Germany as a spirit 
and as a concept/' in France it was demonstrated as "effective 
reality." 
In Lessons in the Philosophy of History Hegel explains that 
the idea of the formal will, of abstract liberty, by which "the 
simple unity of self-consciousness, the I, is the absolute independ-
ent liberty and the source of all universal determinations," "re-
mained among the Germans as a tranquil theory whereas the 
French willed to execute it practically." ... This passage of 
Hegel seems very important as the "source" of the idea expressed 
in the Theses on Feuerbach that "the philosophers have explained 
the world and the problem now is to change it." Philosophy 
must become politics to be true, to continue to be philosophy: 
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"tranquil theory" must be "executed practically," must become 
"effective reality." This passage of Hegel may also be taken as 
the source of Engels' statement that the German working class 
is the heir of German classical philosophy. Finally this passage 
may be considered an element in the development of the theory 
of the unity of theory and practice .... 
Ed. Note: This idea of ((translation" of national cultures 
is interesting but seems at first glance not too useful~ except 
at the low level given by Einaudi of converting one ter-
minology into another. For example~ Marxist concepts can be 
translated into cap'italist concepts: the Marxist concept of 
surplus value is equivalent to the capitalist concepts of prof-
its), interest~ capital investment~ etc. The ability to effect this 
translation is important in the field of research because 
capitalist statistics are governed by capitalist concepts. It is 
also important in the field of propaganda to get Marxist 
ideas accepted by people with capitalist concepts in their 
heads. 
However~ as Gramsci says~ this is a first approximation. At a 
higher level it means to go below surface similarities or dif-
ferences to find the more important relations. The statism of 
the Nazis~ for example~ and the statism of the New Deal had 
many points of similarity including economic measures that 
derived from Keynes in both cases. But in Germany the stat-
ism stifled the people and wrecked German capitalism (it was 
only rescued by the p'resence of the U.S. Army in the 
postwar period and by massive infusions of American capital 
buying into German industry), while in the New Deal statism 
gave a strong spin to the freedoms of the American people 
and stabilized American capitalism. 
At the level of languages themselves, let us examine the question 
of metaphors. A well known Marxist metaphor is the traditional 
one that the "anatomy" of a society is constituted by its "economy." 
This metaphor came out of the discussions in natural sciences and 
the classification of animal species, a classification which became 
"scientific" when it started to be based on anatomy and not on 
secondary characteristics. Furthermore, this metaphor was justi-
lied by its "popularity," that is, it was easily understood by a not 
too intellectual public. (Few ever take into account the fact that 
Marxism, which wishes to develop morally and intellectually 
those social groups which are culturally backward, often has 
recourse to metaphors which are terribly vulgarized.) 
The linguistic origin of a metaphor for a new concept helps 
to understand that concept by showing how it emerged in a given 
cultural world. At the same time it clarifies the limitations of the 
metaphor so that it should not be used mechanically. In a given 
epoch, the experimental sciences served as a kind of "model." 
Since the social sciences, like history and economics, sought an 
objective foundation which would give them the same stability 
as the natural sciences, it is easy to understand why the social 
sciences turned to the physical sciences in creating their own 
terminologies. Incidentally, from this point of view, we should 
differentiate between Marx and Engels, as each one's language 
had different cultural origins and their metaphors reflect dif-
ferent interests. 
Marx and Hegel. In the study of the Hegelianism of Marx we 
must remember that he participated in the German university 
life shortly after the death of Hegel, when the "oral" teaching 
of Hegel must have been extremely vivid, and when there must 
have been passioned discussions which Hegel's teaching certainly 
stimulated, with references to concrete teachings, so that the his-
torical concreteness of Hegel's thought must have been even 
clearer than it is in his systematic writings. Certain sayings of 
Marx seem to me to be especially related to this Hconversational" 
vividness, for example, the saying that Hegel "makes man walk 
with the head downwards." Hegel uses this very image in speak-
ing of the French revolution. He writes that at a certain moment 
of the French revolution it seemed "that the world was walking 
on its head," or something like that. When Croce asks where Marx 
got this image, I would say that I'm pretty sure that it is in a 
book of Hegel (perhaps The Philosophy of Law), but it really 
seems as if it flowed out of a conversation, so fresh it is, so spon-
taneous, so little Hbookish." 
ABOUT ANTONIO GRAMSCI: From the Editor's INTRODUCTION 
Antonio Gramsci is a name practically unknown in America, yet he is one 
of the leading thinkers of the last half-century. An Italian Marxist, he died 
in Mussolini's jails in 1937. When he was arrested in 1926 he was 35 years 
old, married, with one child and another on the way whom he never saw. At 
the time Gramsci was a Deputy to the Chamber (a Congressman) and secre-
tary of the Communist Party of Italy. 
After being moved from jail to jail he was finally transferred to a peni-
tentiary in Bari in July, 1928. For the next six years, until his health com-
pletely broke down. Gramsci studied and wrote, filling thirty-two notebooks 
with notes, observations, and essays. He wrote over a million words, which 
made up six volumes when they were published between 1947 and 1954. States 
a recent Italian encyclopedia: "The thirty-two notebooks written in prison 
constitute a very important document of Italian culture. . . • His letters from 
prison are outstanding as an expression of humanity as well as culture." 
Gramsci is a Marxist of the caliber of the early Kautsky, and he compares 
favorably with Plekhanov and Rosa Luxemburg. He is a Marxist in the great 
tradition of Marx himself, a thinker with an open mind, disciplined in the 
search for truth. The daily newspaper Ordine Nuo'Vo, which he edited, carried 
on its masthead the motto "To Tell the Truth Is Revolutionary." Today, when 
Marxists throughout the world know the consequences of a lack of probity 
and sobriety in theory and practice, Gramsci's austere words are fresh and 
invigorating: . 
"We must not conceive of a scientific discussion as if it were a courtroom 
proceeding in which there are a defendant and a prosecutor who, by duty 
of his office, must show the defendant guilty. It is a premise in scientific 
discussion that the interest lies in the search for truth and the advancement 
of science. Therefore the most 'advanced' thinker is he who understands 
that his adversary may express a truth which should be incorporated in his 
own ideas, even if in a minor way. To understand and evaluate realistically 
the position and reasons of one's adversary (and sometimes the adversary 
is the entire thought of the past) means to have freed oneself from the 
prison of ideologies, in the sense of blind fanaticism. One has then arrived 
at a critical frame of mind, the only fruitful stance in scientific research." 
To speak of Gramsci as a Marxist with an open mind may strike many 
people as a contradiction in terms, because the behavior of a considerable 
number of Marxists has bolstered ruling class propaganda that Marxism is a 
dogma. Marxism is not a dogma though there are Marxists who are dog-
matists, just as science is not dogma though there are scientists who are 
dogmatists. Marx himself made this point when he averred that he was no 
"Marxist." 
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